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The Role of Anger in Symptoms and Processes of Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
Sonya S. Deschênes 
Concordia University, 2014 
Research investigating the associations between anger and symptoms of generalized 
anxiety disorder (GAD) is limited. The goals of the current program of research were to examine 
the various forms of anger associated with GAD as well as the cross-over effects of worry and 
anger on cognitive mechanisms characteristic of GAD and high trait anger. In Study 1, 
participants (N = 381) completed a series of questionnaires assessing various aspects of anger 
and GAD diagnostic criteria via self-report. Our results indicated that GAD analogues reported 
higher levels of trait anger, anger suppression, and hostility than less anxious participants. In 
Study 2, the effects of laboratory-induced anger on negative style, negative beliefs about 
uncertainty, and worry were examined. Participants were randomized to an anger induction 
condition (n = 43) or a control condition (n = 34). An interpretation bias task, questionnaire 
items assessing beliefs about uncertainty, and a structured worry task were administered 
following the manipulation. Participants in the anger condition reported greater increases in 
negative interpretive style and in the belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything than 
participants in the control condition; however no group differences were found with worry. In 
Study 3, the effects of anger and worry on interpretive style and hostile attributions were 
examined. Participants were randomized to a worry induction (n = 51), anger induction (n = 50), 
or control condition (n = 49). We also examined whether GAD analogues reported greater hostile 
interpretations of ambiguous intent than less anxious participants, and whether GAD analogue 




and threatening interpretations of ambiguous information. Although we found no effects of 
condition or interactions between GAD and condition on interpretive style or hostile attributions, 
we found that GAD symptoms were associated with greater negative interpretive style and 
greater hostile attributions. Together, findings from these studies suggest that elevated levels of 
multiple dimensions of anger, as well as hostile attributions, characterize individuals who meet 
diagnostic criteria for GAD and provide some, albeit limited, support for the notion that elevated 
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Anxiety and anger are basic, cross-culturally experienced, adaptive human emotions 
(Darwin, 1872; Ekman & Friesen, 1971). These emotions, however, can become maladaptive 
when experienced excessively. In accordance, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, fifth edition (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) includes a number of 
diagnostic categories for excessive anxiety; yet there is a near absence of diagnostic categories 
for excessive anger. There is also less empirical research on anger than on anxiety (DiGiuseppe 
& Tafrate, 2001; Kassinove & Sukhodolsky, 1995), and there is little empirical research 
examining the co-occurrence of both anger and anxiety (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2007). The 
broad goal of this program of research is to examine the associations between anger and 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) symptoms, as well as to identify possible pathways linking 
anger and GAD.  
Anxiety and GAD 
Whereas fear occurs in the presence of perceived imminent threat, anxiety results from 
the anticipation of future threat (APA, 2013, p. 189). Anxiety can be broken down into state 
anxiety and trait anxiety. Although similar features (e.g., muscle tension, increased heart rate) 
characterize state and trait anxiety, state anxiety is experienced in the moment, whereas trait 
anxiety refers to the general disposition to experience state anxiety (Spielberger et al., 1983). 
Fear and anxiety can be adaptive in certain situations, as these emotions can promote quick 
energy mobilization to enable escape in objectively dangerous situations (Foa & Kozak, 1986; 
Nesse & Elmsworth, 2009). Fear and anxiety, however, can also be pathological and 





exaggerated and distorts reality (Barlow, 2002; Foa, Huppert, & Cahill, 2006), interferes with 
psychosocial functioning, causes substantial distress, and promotes maladaptive behaviours such 
as avoidance of situations that pose no objective danger (Foa et al., 2006). 
Pathological fear and anxiety are the defining features of the anxiety disorders (APA, 
2013), which include social anxiety disorder (SAD), specific phobias, panic disorder (PD), and 
GAD, and until recently also included obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) and post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD; APA, 2000)
1
. The anxiety disorders share the common characteristics of 
excessive fear or anxiety, but differ in the nature of the fear or anxiety-provoking stimulus and 
associated symptoms. For instance, PD is associated with fear of arousal-related bodily 
sensations, SAD with fear of social situations and negative evaluation, specific phobias with 
fears about specific animals, objects or situations, OCD with anxiety triggered by intrusive 
thoughts or images and their respective situational cues, PTSD with anxiety triggered by the 
memories of a traumatic event, and GAD with anxiety triggered by the possibility of negative 
future events (Abramowitz, Deacon, & Whiteside, 2011; APA, 2013). Of the anxiety disorders, 
GAD is one of the least studied (Dugas, Anderson, Deschênes, & Donegan, 2010) despite its 
relatively high prevalence and considerable personal and societal costs (Wittchen, 2002). 
Therefore, research efforts to improve our understanding of GAD are warranted.  
Generalized anxiety disorder. GAD is defined as excessive anxiety and worry about a 
number of events or activities on more days than not, for period of at least six months (APA, 
2013). Individuals with GAD worry about a number of topics, such as finances, relationships, 
work or academic performance, and physical danger. The worries are difficult to control, 
                                                 
1
 The DSM-5 now classifies OCD as an obsessive-compulsive and related disorder, and classifies 
PTSD as a trauma- and stressor-related disorder (APA, 2013). For the purpose of this 
dissertation, for which writing began prior to the publication of the DSM-5, OCD and PTSD are 





interfere with psychosocial functioning, and are accompanied by at least three of six somatic 
symptoms, including restlessness, irritability, fatigue, difficulty concentrating, muscle tension, 
and sleep disturbance (APA, 2013). Epidemiological studies estimate a 12-month prevalence rate 
for GAD of 3.1% and a lifetime prevalence rate of 5.7% (Kessler & Wang, 2008). Women are 
approximately twice more likely than men to be diagnosed with GAD (Vesga-López et al., 
2008). 
GAD is a debilitating and costly disorder; a diagnosis of GAD has been associated with 
quality of life impairments and reduced work productivity (Hoffman, Dukes, & Wittchen, 2008), 
elevated risk for developing cardiovascular diseases (Tully, Cosh, & Baune, 2013), impaired 
immune system functioning (e.g., Vieira et al., 2010), an elevated number of prescribed 
medications (Kertz & Woodruff-Borden, 2011), and greater use of health care resources 
(Hoffman et al., 2008; Wittchen, 2002). In Canada, GAD is associated with elevated costs to the 
health care system (Koerner et al., 2004). Taken together, GAD leads to poor health and 
occupational outcomes and has a high societal cost. Although there are a number of efficacious 
psychological treatments for GAD (e.g., Cuijpers et al., 2014), recovery rates of only 50-60% are 
nonetheless common (Fisher, 2006). Therefore, a notable number of individuals who undergo 
treatment do not attain remission. Furthering our understanding of the mechanisms underlying 
GAD can not only lead to refinements in conceptual models of GAD, but can ultimately lead to 
improvements in treatment protocols and reductions in the personal burden and societal cost of 
GAD.  
Anger  
Many definitions of anger have been proposed (Eckhardt, Norlander, & Deffenbacher, 





state that is elicited by a perception of threat. It is associated with cognitions focused on other’s 
misdeeds and is communicated by a variety of behaviours influenced by social roles, learning 
history, and environmental contingencies” (p.31). In addition, anger can range on a continuum 
from mild annoyance to intense fury and rage (Spielberger, 1988). Similar to anxiety, anger can 
also be broken down into trait anger or state anger. State anger is characterized by perceptions of 
injustice, of being attacked or treated unfairly, or of being frustrated by goal-blocking barriers, 
whereas trait anger is the general disposition to respond to situations with elevations in state 
anger (Spielberger, 1999). That is, individuals with high trait anger tend to experience more 
frequent and more intense state anger than individuals with low trait anger.  
There are many instances in which anger can be adaptive. For example, feelings of anger 
can motivate attack in dangerous or threatening situations (Nesse & Elmsworth, 2009). Anger 
can also help a person recognize a problem, such as interpersonal conflict, and thus motivate 
corrective actions such as reconciliation (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2001). Yet, anger can also 
become maladaptive. Excessive or misplaced anger can lead to negative emotional and 
behavioural consequences such as aggression (DiGiusseppe & Tafrate, 2007) or interpersonal 
conflict (Scherer & Wallbott, 1994), and can have negative health consequences such as elevated 
risk of developing cardiovascular diseases (e.g., Martens, Mols, Burg, & Denollet, 2010). Anger 
is unique as a negative emotion, however, as it is associated with a tendency to approach, rather 
than avoid, anger-eliciting stimuli (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994). It 
is also unique as a negative emotion in that individuals express little desire to control their 
experience of anger, similarly to the experience of joy (Scherer & Wallbott, 1994). Although 
there is currently no diagnostic category for anger as a primary symptom (APA, 2013), 





improve conceptual models of maladaptive anger and treatment protocols (see DiGiuseppe & 
Tafrate, 2007). 
Anger and Anxiety Disorders 
Some research demonstrates a link between anxiety disorders and elevated anger. For 
instance, frequent anger outbursts have been reported in more than half of a sample of 
individuals with anxiety disorders (Lee & Cameron, 1986). Elevated levels of anger and 
hostility, the cognitive component of anger, have also been reported in individuals with different 
anxiety disorders, including PD (Moscovitch et al., 2008), OCD (Moscovitch et al., 2008; 
Radomsky, Ashbaugh, & Gelfand, 2007), and SAD (Erwin, Heimberg, Schneier, & Liebowitz, 
2003; Moscovitch et al., 2008).  
Of the anxiety disorders, PTSD and GAD include certain components of anger as part of 
their diagnostic criteria. Specifically, PTSD includes irritability or outbursts of anger as 
diagnostic symptoms (APA, 2013); consequently, several studies and meta-analyses suggest that 
anger is elevated and problematic in individuals with PTSD (e.g., Hawkins & Cougle, 2011; 
Meffert et al., 2008; Novaco, 2010; Olatunji, Ciesielski, & Tolin, 2010; Orth, Cahill, Foa, & 
Maercker, 2008; Orth & Wieland 2006). Surprisingly, less is known about co-occurrence of 
anger and GAD despite irritability, defined as a lowered threshold for responding with anger 
(DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2007, p. 31), being a symptom of GAD. A limited number of studies 
have examined the association between anger and GAD. One study found that several 
dimensions of anger, including trait anger, outward anger expression, and anger suppression 
were more elevated in individuals with GAD than in individuals with low anxiety, and that anger 
control was greater in the less anxious individuals than in those with GAD (Erdem, Celik, 





evidence of an association between elevated anger experience over the past 30 days and a 
diagnosis of GAD. Although this suggests associations between these constructs, the nature of 
the associations between anger, worry, and GAD requires further exploration.  
Cognitive Mechanisms 
One possible pathway linking anger and anxiety is a common underlying cognitive-
processing style. The importance of cognitive processing in the elicitation of either anger or 
anxiety has been recognized by researchers who have suggested that a sense of mastery and 
control over the emotion-eliciting situation may differentiate the experience of anxiety/fear and 
anger. Specifically, perceiving the threatening stimulus as insurmountable can lead to the 
experience of fear and anxiety, whereas perceiving the threatening stimulus as conquerable can 
lead to the experience of anger (e.g., Barlow, 2002; Frijda, 1986). However, there have been few 
empirical investigations of the mechanisms involved in the co-occurrence of anxiety and anger.  
Given that cognitive-processing styles are involved in the etiology and maintenance of 
anxiety disorders and high trait anger, shared cognitive processes may explain this relationship. 
The cognitive theory of anxiety is a central etiological theory of fear and anxiety disorders (see 
Clark & Beck, 2010). The theory posits that core beliefs (i.e., schemas) affect the way in which 
information from the environment is processed. In highly anxious individuals, distorted schemas 
increase the likelihood of processing of information as threatening, which in turn leads to anxiety 
and related symptoms (e.g., worry, fear). A number of conceptual models of GAD have been 
developed based on this theory, with cognitive vulnerabilities at the root of symptom expression. 
For instance, intolerance of uncertainty, defined as “a dispositional characteristic that results 
from a set of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its implications” (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007, 





GAD. Research based on this model demonstrates that individuals with GAD fear the unknown 
and imagine worst case scenarios when feeling uncertain; they also have difficulty tolerating the 
distress associated with uncertainty (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). In addition to content-based 
cognitive vulnerabilities (i.e., beliefs, thoughts and attitudes), GAD is also characterized by 
cognitive processing biases towards threat (i.e., information processing). For instance, 
individuals with high trait anxiety or a diagnosis of GAD report more threatening interpretations 
of ambiguous, potentially threatening or neutral, situations (e.g., Dalgleish, 1994; Davey, 
Hampton, Farrell, & Davidson, 1992; MacLeod & Cohen, 1993; Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck, 
1989; Mogg et al., 1994). In keeping with cognitive theory, greater intolerance of uncertainty is 
associated with a greater likelihood of interpreting ambiguous events as threatening (Koerner & 
Dugas, 2008).  
Cognitive vulnerabilities and processing biases involved in emotional disorders are, at 
least to some extent, transdiagnostic (e.g., Carleton et al., 2012; Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012). It 
is not surprising, therefore, that cognitive processes characteristic of anxiety disorders are also 
involved in high trait anger (Owen, 2011). These biased cognitive-processing styles include 
selective attention towards anger-related stimuli (e.g., Putman, Hermans, & van Honk, 2004) or 
hostile stimuli (Wilkowski, Robinson, Gordon, & Troop-Gordon, 2007), enhanced memory for 
anger-related concepts (Parrott, Zeichner, & Evces, 2005), and interpretation biases such as 
appraising ambiguous situations as hostile (e.g., Hazebroek, Howells, & Day, 2001). Thus, a 
hyper-vigilance for hostility seems to relate to high trait anger.  
Current Program of Research 
Overall, a number of studies suggest that anger is elevated in individuals with anxiety 





about the various forms of anger experience (e.g., hostility, trait anger) and expressions (e.g., 
anger suppression, aggression, anger control) that are associated with GAD, or about the 
cognitive mechanisms (e.g., cognitive vulnerabilities, biased interpretations) underlying this 
association. The overarching objective of this program of research is to examine the nature of the 
association between anger and symptoms of GAD with three independent studies. The main goal 
of study 1 is to examine which facets of anger relate to GAD, with the use of self-report 
questionnaires. The main goal of study 2 is to examine the effects of state anger on cognitive 
vulnerabilities and processes underlying GAD, using an ecologically-valid anger induction. 
Finally, the main goals of study 3 are to examine the effects of worry and anger inductions, 
compared to a relaxation induction, on cognitive processes associated with high trait anger and 
GAD, and to examine whether individuals who meet diagnostic criteria for GAD (i.e., GAD 







THE ROLE OF ANGER IN GENERALIZED ANXIETY DISORDER 
Anger and anxiety have historically been linked through shared physiological reactions to 
stress (e.g., Cannon, 1929). In particular, anger and anxiety may be related through underlying 
biological vulnerabilities, such that when confronted with threat, individuals react either with 
anger or anxiety, that is, “fight” or “flight” (Barlow, 2002). According to this theory, the 
individual’s sense of mastery over the threatening situation predicts the type of reaction, with 
high perceived mastery predicting anger, and low perceived mastery predicting anxiety. This 
suggests that appraisals are an important feature of both emotions. Despite this, anger, defined as 
an emotion elicited by perceptions of threat caused by the misdeeds of others (DiGiuseppe & 
Tafrate, 2007), has received little empirical attention in the context of anxiety disorders.  
However, there is some evidence to suggest that elevated levels of anger are present in 
individuals with anxiety disorders. In addition to trait and state anger, some dimensions of anger 
that have been examined include hostility (the cognitive component of anger), aggression (the 
behavioural component of anger), internalized anger expression (the tendency to suppress angry 
feelings), externalized anger expression (the tendency to outwardly express angry feelings), and 
anger control (the ability to regulate anger). Specifically, Moscovitch and colleagues (2008) 
found elevated levels of hostility in individuals with SAD, OCD, and PD, relative to non-anxious 
controls. They also found that individuals with PD reported higher levels of aggressive anger, 
and that individuals with SAD reported lower verbal aggression compared to non-anxious 
controls. Erwin and colleagues (2003) also found elevated trait anger and internalized anger 
expression in individuals with SAD, relative to non-anxious individuals. Of the anxiety 





Meffert and colleagues (2008) found that greater levels of anger mediated the relationship 
between trauma exposure and PTSD symptoms among police officers. In addition, meta-
analytical findings suggest that PTSD symptoms are related to various dimensions of anger, 
particularly internalized anger expression, with large effects (Olatunji et al., 2010; Orth & 
Wieland 2006). However, a recent study showed that, after controlling for demographic 
variables, PTSD did not significantly predict anger expression, but did significantly predict anger 
experience over a 30-day period (Hawkins & Cougle, 2011). 
Only a few studies have examined the relation between anger and GAD. This is 
surprising because irritability, which is characterized by a lowered threshold for anger 
(DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2007), is a symptom of GAD (APA, 2000). Erdem and colleagues 
(2008) found that individuals with GAD had greater levels of trait anger, externalized anger 
expression, internalized anger expression, as well as lower anger control (i.e., lower self-
regulation of anger), than did non-anxious individuals. More recently, Hawkins and Cougle 
(2011) found that greater anger expression, as well as anger experience over a 30-day period, 
was associated with GAD independently of shared associations with other psychiatric conditions. 
Overall, these findings suggest that anger may be an important emotion associated with GAD. 
Although the abovementioned studies examined the relations between specific anger dimensions 
(e.g., trait anger, anger expression) and GAD, the relative contributions of each anger dimension 
to GAD is largely unknown.  
The goal of the current study was to examine the relations between specific dimensions 
of anger and the presence and severity of GAD by: 1) comparing individuals who meet 
diagnostic criteria for GAD to individuals who do not meet diagnostic criteria for GAD on a 





to GAD status; and 3) examining the extent to which anger dimensions predict GAD symptom 
severity, in individuals who meet diagnostic criteria for GAD. The anger dimensions examined 
were based on the subscales of the questionnaires used in the current study (see below).  
It was hypothesized that individuals who meet diagnostic criteria for GAD would differ 
from individuals who do not meet diagnostic criteria for GAD on a combination of anger 
dimensions, and that lower scores on externalized and internalized anger control and higher 
scores on all other anger dimensions would predict greater GAD symptom severity. Although the 
examination of the relative contribution of anger dimensions to GAD status was largely 
exploratory, we expected that trait anger and internalized anger (i.e., inwards anger expression, 
hostility) would contribute more to GAD than would externalized anger (i.e., outwards anger 
expression, physical aggression, and verbal aggression). This hypothesis was derived from the 
evidence suggesting that internalized anger (e.g., Olatunji et al., 2010) and hostility (e.g., 
Moscovitch et al., 2008) are strong predictors of other anxiety disorders.   
Method 
Participants 
Three hundred and eighty-one (N = 381) undergraduate students, between the ages of 18 
and 57 (M = 23.49, SD = 6.27), participated in the study in exchange for course credit. The 
majority of the sample was female (85.79%) and studying in the field of psychology (71.39%). 
Most participants (38.10%) were in their first year of study, 25.93% were in their second year, 
20.63% were in their third year, and 15.34% were in their fourth year, with 87.73% of the sample 
studying full-time. The majority of the sample (63.47%) reported English as their first language, 
14.67% reported French, and 21.87% reported “other” as their first language. The majority of 





Racial, 5.53% as Black, 5.00% as Latino, and 5.00% as Middle Eastern, whereas 5.53% reported 
“other” as their ethnicity.  
Measures 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 2002). The 
GAD-Q-IV was developed as a screening tool for the diagnosis of GAD. It is composed of 14 
self-reported items that assess the symptoms of GAD based on the DSM-IV (APA, 2000) 
diagnostic criteria. Eleven of the items are rated dichotomously (i.e., the presence or absence of 
symptoms), one item requires participants to list worry topics, and two items assess the degree of 
interference and the degree of distress resulting from worrying on a Likert scale ranging from 0 
(None) to 8 (Very severe). The GAD-Q-IV demonstrates convergent and discriminant validity, a 
kappa agreement of .67 with a structured diagnostic interview of GAD, and test-retest reliability 
of 92% over two weeks. The recommended cut-off score for individuals meeting diagnostic 
criteria is 5.7 out of a total of 13 (Newman et al., 2002), with scores of 5.7 and above indicating 
the presence of GAD (i.e., GAD analogues), and a score below 5.7 indicating the absence of 
GAD (i.e., non-GAD). 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990). The PSWQ is a 16-item self-report measure that assesses the tendency to worry. 
Participants rate the extent to which items are typical of themselves on a Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (Not at all typical) to 5 (Very typical), with items such as “I am always worrying about 
something”. The PSWQ has demonstrated convergent and divergent validity, excellent internal 
consistency (α = .93), and test-retest reliability over eight to ten weeks (r = .92).  
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 1999). The 





dispositional characteristic (trait anger scale), situational anger (state anger scale), and the 
expression of anger (anger expression scale). Given the goals of the current study, only the trait 
anger and anger expression scales were included. The 10-item Trait Anger scale (T-ANG) 
assesses the frequency and intensity of anger experiences, with items such as “I get angry when 
I’m slowed down by other’s mistakes” rated on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (Almost never) to 4 
(Almost always). The 32-item Anger Expression scale is composed of four subscales that assess 
how people react when they are angry. For each 8-item subscale, the extent to which participants 
generally react when angry is rated on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (Almost never) to 4 (Almost 
always). The Anger Expression-Out (AX-O) subscale measures the expression of anger towards 
objects or other individuals with the use of physically or verbally aggressive behaviours, and 
includes items such as “I strike out at whatever infuriates me”. The Anger Expression-In (AX-I) 
subscale measures the extent to which angry feelings are experienced yet suppressed (i.e., lack of 
expression), and includes items such as “I boil inside, but I don’t show it”. The Anger Control-
Out (AC-O) subscale assesses the extent to which a person controls his or her anger by 
preventing the externalized expression of anger, and includes items such as “I keep my cool”. 
Finally, the Anger Control-In (AC-I) subscale assesses the extent to which a person controls 
angry feelings by attempts to calm down and cool off, and includes items such as “I do 
something relaxing to calm down”. The STAXI-2 subscales have demonstrated construct validity 
and adequate internal consistency with α’s ranging from .70 to .85.  
Aggression Questionnaire (AQ; Buss & Perry, 1992). The AQ is a 29-item self-report 
measure that assesses the disposition of aggression, and is composed of four subscales. For each 
subscale, the extent to which each statement is characteristic or uncharacteristic of participants is 





characteristic of me). The Physical Aggression (AQ-PA) subscale is composed of 8 items and 
assesses the motor component of aggressive behaviour, which involves the desire to harm others, 
with items such as “Once in a while, I can’t control the urge to strike another person”. The 
Verbal Aggression (AQ-VA) subscale is composed of 5 items and assesses instrumental 
aggression with items such as “When people annoy me, I may tell them what I think of them”. 
The Anger (AQ-ANG) subscale is composed of 7 items and assesses the affective component of 
aggression, including physiological arousal and preparation for aggression, with items such as “I 
have trouble controlling my temper”. Finally, the Hostility (AQ-HOST) subscale is composed of 
8 items and measures the cognitive component of aggression, including feelings of injustice, 
with items such as “When people are especially nice, I wonder what they want”. The AQ has 
good internal consistency (α = .89) and test-retest reliability over nine weeks (r = .80).  
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited in psychology undergraduate classes or through the 
Department of Psychology’s Participant Pool at Concordia University. They were invited to 
complete a series of questionnaires on anger and anxiety, administered in a quasi-
counterbalanced order, either individually or in groups of up to ten participants. The 




Data were normally distributed (all skewness values < 3.0 and kurtosis values < 10.0; 
Kline, 2009), and therefore no outliers were removed. The correlations between the GAD-Q-IV 





.05). Male sex was significantly correlated with greater externalized anger control and greater 
physical aggression, whereas female sex was significantly correlated with higher scores on the 
GAD-Q-IV. Age was negatively related to hostility. Because the strengths of the correlations 
were weak (rs < .17), we did not statistically control for age and sex in subsequent analyses. See 
Table 1 for a correlation matrix. 
Next, we used the recommended cut-off score (5.7; Newman et al., 2002) on the GAD-Q-
IV to create the GAD-analogue (n = 131) and non-GAD (n = 250) groups. Given that worry is 
the primary feature of GAD, we examined the validity of the GAD-Q-IV in our sample by 
conducting an independent-samples t-test between the groups on PSWQ scores. We found that, 
as expected, the GAD-analogue group had significantly higher scores (M = 63.00, SD = 10.64) 
than did the non-GAD group (M = 46.00, SD =12.44), t(378) = -13.26, p < .001. These means 
and standard deviations are comparable to those of clinical samples of individuals with GAD 
(e.g., M = 65.27, SD = 8.50; Ladouceur et al., 2000) and samples of non-anxious individuals 
(e.g., M = 47.08, SD = 13.24; Behar, Alcaine, Zuellig, & Borkovec, 2003). 
Anger and GAD Group Membership 
To examine the difference between the GAD-analogue group and the non-GAD group on 
the STAXI-2 subscales, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted. GAD 
group membership served as the independent variable, and the STAXI-2 subscales served as the 
dependent variables. As expected, there was a statistically significant difference between the 
GAD-analogue group and the non-GAD group on the combined STAXI-2 anger subscales, Λ = 
0.90, F(5, 374) = 8.09, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .098. See Table 2 for means and standard deviations of the 






Correlations between the GAD-Q-IV, the STAXI-2, and the AQ (N = 381) 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 12 
1. GAD-Q-IV  1.00 .34**  .25**  .33**  -.16**  -.15**  .17**  .10*  .34**  .46** -.033 -.16** 
2. T-ANG1   1.00  .70**  .38**  -.57**  -.41  .63**  .52**  .73**  .55** -.09 -.07 
3. AX-O   1.00  .20**  -.59**  -.40**  .57**  .61**  .63**  .34* -.10 -.04 
4. AX-I    1.00  -.06  -.14**  .16**  .07  .28**  .55** -.04 .03 
5. AC-O     1.00  .66**  -.43**  -.45**  -.62** -.26** .02 .12* 
6. AC-I      1.00  -.29**  -.29**  -.44** -.27** .06 .04 
7. AQ-PA       1.00  .49**  .60**  .37** -.06 .13* 
8. AQ-VA        1.00  .54**  .36** -.06 .05 
9. AQ-ANG         1.00  .50** -.01 -.08 
10. AQ-HOST           1.00 -.12* -.08 
11. Age           1.00 .02 
12. Sexa            1.00 





Note. GAD-Q-IV = Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire IV; STAXI-2 = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory, second 
edition; AQ = Aggression Questionnaire; T-ANG = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory II – Trait Scale; AX-O = State-Trait 
Anger Expression Inventory II – Anger Expression-Out subscale; AX-I = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory II – Anger 
Expression-In subscale; AC-O = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory II – Anger Control-Out subscale; AC-I = State-Trait Anger 
Expression Inventory II – Anger Control-In subscale; AQ-PA = Aggression Questionnaire – Physical Aggression Subscale; AQ-VA = 
Aggression Questionnaire – Verbal Aggression Subscale; AQ-ANG = Aggression Questionnaire – Anger Subscale; AQ-HOST = 
Aggression Questionnaire – Hostility Subscale. 
1
Data missing for one participant (n = 380) 
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Table 2  
Means and Standard Deviations for the STAXI-2 by GAD Group Membership 
 GAD-analogue (n = 131) Non-GAD (n = 250) 

























 5.06  22.38
b
  4.71 
Note. Means with differing superscripts are significantly different (p < .05). STAXI-2 = State-
Trait Anger Expression Inventory, second edition; GAD = generalized anxiety disorder; T-ANG 
= State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory II – Trait Scale; AX-O = State-Trait Anger Expression 
Inventory II – Anger Expression-Out subscale; AX-I = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory II 
– Anger Expression-In subscale; AC-O = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory II – Anger 
Control-Out subscale; AC-I = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory II – Anger Control-In 
subscale.  
1






A discriminant function analysis was conducted to examine the relative contribution of 
each STAXI-2 subscale to GAD group membership. The correlations between the predictors and 
the discriminant function (i.e., the structure matrix) suggest that elevated T-ANG (Trait Anger) 
and AX-I (Anger Expression-In) accounted for the most variance in GAD group membership 
(loadings less than .50 are not interpreted; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). See Table 3 for canonical 
coefficients and the structure matrix. Using Jackknife classification, a method used to classify 
each case by the functions derived from all other cases, the discriminant function could be used 
to correctly classify 63.95% (n = 243) of individuals into their respective groups, with 57.25% (n 
= 75) correctly classified as GAD-analogue and 67.47% (n = 168) correctly classified as non-
GAD. The difference in the proportions of correct classification was significant, χ2 = 3.89, p = 
.049, suggesting that the STAXI-2 subscales can better identify individuals who do not meet 
diagnostic criteria for GAD than those who do.  
 To assess the effect of anger on GAD symptom severity, a multiple regression analysis 
predicting GAD-Q-IV continuous scores was conducted within the GAD-analogue group (n = 
131), with the STAXI-2 subscales entered as predictors. As expected, the regression model was 
statistically significant, F(5, 125) = 3.54, R
2
 = .124, p = .005. Of the predictor variables, only 
AX-I significantly predicted GAD symptom severity (β = .22, p = .017). See Table 4 for detailed 
results of the multiple regression analysis. 
Aggression and GAD Group Membership 
To examine the difference between the GAD-analogue group and the non-GAD group on 
the AQ subscales, a MANOVA was conducted. GAD group membership served as the 






Standardized Canonical Coefficients and Structure Matrix for the STAXI-2 Predicting GAD 
Group Status (N = 380
1
) 
STAXI-2 Subscales Standardized Canonical Coefficients  Structure Matrix 
T-ANG  .570  .815 
AX-O  .090  .567 
AX-I  .553  .780 
AC-O  .190 -.372 
AC-I  -.266 -.462 
Note. STAXI-2 = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory, second edition; GAD = generalized 
anxiety disorder; T-ANG = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory II – Trait Scale; AX-O = 
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory II – Anger Expression-Out subscale; AX-I = State-Trait 
Anger Expression Inventory II – Anger Expression-In subscale; AC-O = State-Trait Anger 
Expression Inventory II – Anger Control-Out subscale; AC-I = State-Trait Anger Expression 
Inventory II – Anger Control-In subscale.  
1







Table 4  
Multiple Regression for the STAXI-2 Predicting GAD Symptom Severity in GAD-Analogues (n = 
131) 
  [Lower, Upper] 
STAXI-2 Subscales  R
2
  B  SE β  95% Confidence Interval for B 
STEP 1  .124  
 T-ANG  .067 .045 .211 [-.022, .155] 
 AX-O  .019 .057 .048 [-.094, .133]  
 AX-I  .091* .038 .215 [.016, .165]  
 AC-O   .011  .055  .029  [-.097, .119] 
 AC-I   .014  .044  .036  [-.074, .101] 
*p < .05 
Note. STAXI-2 = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory, second edition; GAD = generalized 
anxiety disorder; T-ANG = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory II – Trait Scale; AX-O = 
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory II – Anger Expression-Out subscale; AX-I = State-Trait 
Anger Expression Inventory II – Anger Expression-In subscale; AC-O = State-Trait Anger 
Expression Inventory II – Anger Control-Out subscale; AC-I = State-Trait Anger Expression 







As expected, there was a statistically significant difference between the GAD-analogue group 
and the non-GAD group on the combined AQ subscales, Λ = 0.84, F(4, 376) = 17.34, p < .001, 
ηp
2
 = .156. See Table 5 for means and standard deviations of AQ subscales by GAD group 
membership.  
 A discriminant function analysis was conducted to examine the relative contribution of 
each AQ subscale to GAD group membership. The correlations between the predictors and the 
discriminant function suggest that elevated AQ-HOST (Hostility) and AQ-ANG (Anger) 
accounted for the most variance in GAD group membership. See Table 6 for canonical 
coefficients and the structure matrix. Using Jackknife classification, the discriminant function 
could be used to correctly classify 66.93% (n = 255) of individuals into their respective groups, 
with 64.89% (n = 85) correctly classified as GAD-analogue and 68.00% (n = 170) correctly 
classified as non-GAD. The difference in the proportions of correct classification was not 
statistically significant, χ2 =.38, p = .54.   
To assess the association of aggression to GAD symptom severity, a multiple regression 
analysis with AQ subscales predicting GAD-Q-IV continuous scores was conducted within the 
GAD-analogue group. As expected, the regression model was statistically significant, F(4, 126) 
= 7.80, R
2
 = .198, p < .001. Of the predictor variables, only hostility (AQ-HOST) significantly 
predicted GAD symptom severity (β = .39, p < .001).  See Table 7 for detailed results of the 
multiple regression analysis.  
Discussion 
 The goal of the current study was to examine the relations between specific dimensions of 
anger and the presence and severity of GAD. Overall, our results suggest that heightened levels 





Table 5  
Means and Standard Deviations for the AQ by GAD Group Membership 
 GAD-analogue (n = 131) Non-GAD (n = 250) 





















Note. Means with differing superscripts are significantly different (p < .05). AQ = Aggression 
Questionnaire; GAD = generalized anxiety disorder; AQ-PA = Aggression Questionnaire – 
Physical Aggression Subscale; AQ-VA = Aggression Questionnaire – Verbal Aggression 
Subscale; AQ-ANG = Aggression Questionnaire – Anger Subscale; AQ-HOST = Aggression 





Table 6  
Standardized Canonical Coefficients and Structure Matrix for the AQ Predicting GAD Group 
Membership (N = 380
1
) 
AQ Subscales Standardized Canonical Coefficients  Structure Matrix 
AQ-PA  -.163  .268 
AQ-VA  -.444 .108 
AQ-ANG  .624 .645 
AQ-HOST  .799 .862 
Note. AQ = Aggression Questionnaire; GAD = generalized anxiety disorder; AQ-PA = 
Aggression Questionnaire – Physical Aggression Subscale; AQ-VA = Aggression Questionnaire 
– Verbal Aggression Subscale; AQ-ANG = Aggression Questionnaire – Anger Subscale; AQ-
HOST = Aggression Questionnaire – Hostility Subscale. 
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Table 7  
Multiple Regression for the AQ Predicting GAD Symptom Severity in GAD-Analogues (n = 131) 
  [Lower, Upper] 
AQ Subscales  R
2
  B  SE β  95% Confidence Interval for B 
STEP 1  .198  
 AQ-PA  .036 .028 .149 [-.019, .091] 
 AQ-VA  .002 .043 .006 [-.083, .087]  
 AQ-ANG  -.011 .034 -.037 [-.078, .057]  
 AQ-HOST   .131**  .030 .386 [.072, .190] 
** p < .01 
Note. AQ = Aggression Questionnaire; GAD = generalized anxiety disorder; AQ-PA = 
Aggression Questionnaire – Physical Aggression Subscale; AQ-VA = Aggression Questionnaire 
– Verbal Aggression Subscale; AQ-ANG = Aggression Questionnaire – Anger Subscale; AQ-







of aggression, and hostility, are uniquely related to GAD status. Our results also suggest that, 
when controlling for shared variance between the subscales, only internalized anger expression 
from the STAXI and hostility from the AQ uniquely contribute to the severity of 
GAD symptoms within individuals who meet diagnostic criteria. These findings are broadly 
consistent with our hypotheses. 
The current findings are also in keeping with previous research on anger and anxiety 
disorders demonstrating that elevated anger levels, particularly internalized anger expression 
(e.g., Bridewell & Chang, 1997; Orth & Wieland, 2006) and hostility (e.g., Moscovitch et al., 
2008), are present in anxious individuals. Also in accordance with our findings, Erdem and 
colleagues (2008) found that individuals with GAD have elevated levels of trait anger and anger 
expression. Although Hawkins and Cougle (2011) showed that a diagnosis of GAD was related 
to elevated anger experience and a greater tendency to express anger externally, they did not 
assess the tendency to express anger internally. Our results suggest that when the shared variance 
between internal and external anger expression is controlled, internalized anger expression is a 
stronger predictor of GAD.  
Although our results do not address the question of why anger and GAD tend to co-occur, 
one possibility is that they are functionally related due to shared information processing biases. 
For example, Barrazone and Davey (2009) found that both angry and anxious mood inductions 
led to increased threat interpretations of ambiguous homophones (e.g., slay/sleigh). Relatedly, 
Owen (2011) concluded based on a review of the published literature that high trait anger is 
characterized by similar transdiagnostic cognitive processes (e.g., selective attention) as other 
emotional disorders such as depression and anxiety disorders. In addition, anger and GAD may 





uncertainty arises from a set of negative beliefs, including the belief that uncertainty is unfair 
(Sexton & Dugas, 2009). Similarly, anger has been associated with perceived unfairness (e.g., 
Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005). One possibility is that perceiving a state of uncertainty as 
unfair can lead to anger, anxiety, or both, in individuals who do not cope well with uncertainty. 
Future studies should aim to examine the role of intolerance of uncertainty in anger. Overall, it 
seems possible that similar cognitive processes contribute to both anger and anxiety. Another 
possibility relates to a model of GAD that posits that the heightened intensity of many emotions 
contribute to GAD (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2005). Thus, individuals with GAD 
may find anger and other emotions overwhelming, and these individuals may therefore worry 
about the consequences of losing control over their anger.  
Anger may be particularly important to examine in the context of anxiety disorders as it 
can interfere with cognitive-behavioural treatment (CBT). For instance, one study found that pre-
treatment anger predicted poorer response to CBT for individuals with SAD (Erwin et al., 2003). 
Although the mechanisms by which anger leads to poor CBT responses are unknown, one 
possibility is that anger interferes with common therapy factors in the treatment of anxiety 
disorders. For example, anger may interfere with the development of a strong therapeutic 
alliance, as suggested by DiGiuseppe, Tafrate, and Eckhardt (1994). In addition, anger may lead 
to lower motivation in treatment or resistance to change, or a less collaborative approach to goal 
setting, all of which are known to affect treatment response (Hubble, Duncan, & Miller, 2004).  
It is currently unknown whether anger leads to poor responses in CBT for GAD. We can 
postulate, however, that anger may interfere with some components of empirically-supported 
CBT protocols for GAD. For example, Roemer and Orsillo (2007) developed a treatment 





intensity and frequency of negative internal experiences. Anger may interfere with clients’ 
ability to focus awareness on the present moment and accept internal experiences. Another 
empirically-supported CBT protocol for GAD includes problem-solving training as a component 
of treatment (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). Given that high levels of anger and hostility have been 
found to predict poor social problem-solving skills (D’Zurilla, Chang, & Sanna, 2003), 
individuals with GAD who have elevated anger may be faced with particular challenges when 
attempting to solve their day-to-day problems. The effect of anger on specific components of 
treatment, however, requires further exploration.  
 The finding that scores on measures of anger and aggression correctly classified 
individuals meeting diagnostic criteria for GAD at a greater than chance level (57.3% and 
64.9%, respectively) is noteworthy. These findings suggest that it may be valuable for clinicians 
to inquire about anger difficulties in clients with GAD to obtain a more complete understanding 
of potential emotional problems, particularly given that difficulties with anger management are 
not screened for in common diagnostic assessments, with the exception of borderline personality 
disorder (e.g., The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis-II Disorders (SCID-II); First 
et al., 1997). 
Limitations 
A possible caveat to empirically investigating anger is the lack of a consistent definition 
of anger and its related constructs (Eckhardt et al., 2004). There is currently little agreement on 
definitions for the dimensions of anger, and this likely affects the development of self-report 
anger assessments. Thus, the reliance on such self-report measures in the present study is a 
limitation. Future studies could improve on this by using multi-method assessments of anger. In 





students enrolled in at least one psychology course. Although analogue samples have been 
shown to be similar to clinical samples of individuals with GAD on measures of worry and 
anxiety (Roemer, Borkovec, Posa, & Borkovec, 1995), we cannot be certain that the anger levels 
reported by our GAD-analogue group would be comparable to individuals with GAD who were 
recruited from a clinical setting.  
Arguably, another limitation is that our statistical analyses did not control for depression. 
Elevated anger levels have been found in individuals with major depression (e.g., Riley, Treiber, 
& Woods, 1989), and GAD and major depression are highly comorbid (e.g., Brown et al., 2001). 
It is therefore possible that our results were in part due to shared variance between anger and 
depression. However, the decision to exclude depression as a covariate was made to increase the 
ecological validity of our results. Specifically, there are a number of symptoms of GAD and 
depression that overlap, such as difficulty concentrating, fatigue, and sleep disturbance (APA, 
2000), and these criteria were included in our measure of GAD. In addition, negative affect is 
common to both anxiety and depression, as suggested by the tripartite model of depression and 
anxiety (Clark & Watson, 1991). Relatedly, depressive symptoms are important features of the 
clinical presentation of GAD, and controlling for these would “exclude” a number of symptoms 
that make up the diagnostic criteria for GAD, thereby limiting the generalizability of our results. 
Furthermore, Miller and Chapman (2001) suggested that statistically “removing” shared variance 
between two conceptually similar constructs (e.g., anxiety and depression) leads to poor 
construct validity of the target construct. In summary, we chose not to control for depression, 








The potential link between anger and GAD in cognitive-behavioural contexts has not 
been given much attention. This is reflected in the scarce literature on anger and GAD, and the 
lack of recommendations for addressing anger-related symptoms in evidence-based treatments 
for GAD. The current findings highlight the importance of examining the co-occurrence of anger 
and GAD. Overall, our results suggest that multiple facets of anger are related to GAD 
symptoms; although further research is needed to identify the mechanisms by which high trait 








Results from study 1 demonstrate that GAD is positively related to multiple components 
of anger, including trait anger, anger suppression, and hostility. It is unclear, however, why GAD 
and anger are related. Possibly, elevated anger perpetuates symptoms of GAD as well as 
underlying cognitive vulnerabilities and processes. One way to test this hypothesis is by inducing 
anger in one group to observe its effects on cognitive mechanisms and symptoms of GAD 
relative to a control group. In study 2, anger was elicited in one group of participants via a hostile 
interaction with a research assistant. A neutral interaction with a research assistant served as a 
control condition. We examined the impact of induced anger on worry, a primary diagnostic 
symptom of GAD (APA, 2013), as well as on negative beliefs about uncertainty and threatening 
interpretations of ambiguous information, which are cognitive mechanisms involved in the 






THE EFFECTS OF ANGER ON WORRY AND COGNITIVE VULNERABILITIES 
UNDERLYING GENERALIZED ANXIETY DISORDER 
Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), characterized by excessive worry and anxiety 
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000; 2013), is a debilitating disorder that is costly to 
society (Wittchen, 2002) and affects approximately 5.7% of the general population (Kessler et 
al., 2005). Despite its prevalence and economic burden, GAD remains an understudied disorder 
(Dugas, Anderson, et al., 2010). Although irritability is a criterion for the diagnosis of GAD, the 
association between anger, a construct closely related to irritability, and GAD is particularly 
understudied. Cross-sectional studies suggest associations between anger and symptoms of 
GAD; however the nature of these associations is not fully understood. Erdem and colleagues 
(2008) demonstrated that individuals diagnosed with GAD endorsed greater levels of trait anger, 
internalized anger expression (i.e., anger suppression), and externalized anger expression, than 
non-anxious individuals. Similarly, Deschênes, Dugas, Fracalanza, and Koerner (2012) showed 
that various facets of anger, particularly anger suppression and hostility, differentiated 
individuals who endorsed symptoms of GAD from those who did not. Although the 
abovementioned studies suggest associations between anger and symptoms of GAD, little 
research has focused on why anger and GAD are associated. Cognitive vulnerabilities such as 
core beliefs and information processing styles contribute to the development and maintenance of 
psychopathology (Clark & Beck, 2010), and conceivably, anger may perpetuate the cognitive 
vulnerabilities that maintain GAD symptomology.  
A dominant theory of emotion posits that cognitions, such as interpretations of events, 





(2010) propose that biases in interpretive processing (i.e., consistently negative regardless of the 
event) are involved in the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders, including GAD. 
Individuals with GAD tend to experience a hypervigilance for threat and danger, which is 
evidenced by threat-related interpretations of ambiguous (potentially negative) information 
(Anderson et al., 2012; Clark & Beck, 2010; Davey et al., 1992). As such, a negative interpretive 
style is associated with increased risk of developing GAD symptoms. Another cognitive 
vulnerability to GAD is intolerance of uncertainty. A cognitive model of GAD (Dugas & 
Robichaud, 2007) postulates that intolerance of uncertainty, which results from negative beliefs 
about uncertainty, contributes to the development and maintenance of GAD symptoms. These 
negative beliefs about uncertainty include the beliefs that uncertainty has negative behavioural 
and self-referent implications, and that uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything (Sexton & 
Dugas, 2009). This cognitive model has been validated in multiple cross-sectional (e.g., Buhr & 
Dugas, 2006) and experimental studies (e.g., Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000), and has led 
to a successful empirically-supported cognitive-behavioural intervention that targets beliefs 
about uncertainty in individuals with GAD (e.g., Dugas, Brillon, et al., 2010; Ladouceur, Dugas, 
et al., 2000).  
Bidirectional relationships between cognitive processes and affective states have also 
been proposed, postulating that emotion can precede cognitive processing (Schwarz & Clore, 
2007; Zajonc, 1984). Indeed, there is evidence that anger affects interpretive style by increasing 
the likelihood of interpreting ambiguous stimuli in a threatening manner. Specifically, Barazzone 
and Davey (2009) found that laboratory-induced anger led to greater threat-related spellings of 
ambiguous homophone words (e.g., slay/sleigh; pain/pane), relative to a control condition. 





threatening, an investigation of a broader range of ambiguous situations is necessary to draw 
conclusions regarding interpretive style in GAD. That is, individuals with GAD worry about 
various topics such as finances, health, relationships, and harm, and it is therefore important to 
examine how anger might affect interpretations of various ambiguous situations.  
In addition, it is unclear whether the experience of anger directly affects GAD symptoms 
or beliefs about uncertainty, given that the available studies assessing these relationships are 
correlational. Specifically, high trait anger and anger expression were associated with a greater 
tendency to endorse negative beliefs about uncertainty in a group of individuals with OCD 
(Radomsky et al., 2007). Further, negative beliefs about uncertainty partially mediated the 
association between GAD symptom severity and various forms of anger (i.e., anger suppression, 
hostility, trait anger) in university students (Fracalanza, Koerner, Deschênes, & Dugas, 2014). 
High levels of trait anger were also associated with high levels of trait worry (e.g., Stewart et al., 
2010), and more broadly, with GAD symptom severity (Deschênes et al., 2012; Erdem et al., 
2008). One method to assess the direct effect of anger on features of GAD is by the use of 
experimental manipulations; however to date, no studies have examined the impact of 
experimentally inducing anger on GAD symptoms and associated cognitive vulnerabilities.  
To further understand the nature of the association between GAD and anger, the goals of 
the study were to examine the effects of experimentally induced anger on worry, the primary 
diagnostic feature of GAD, and cognitive vulnerabilities underlying GAD. Anger was elicited in 
participants using a well-validated anger-induction procedure. Following the induction, the 
extent to which participants interpreted ambiguous (possibly neutral or threatening) information 
as negative, endorsed negative beliefs about uncertainty, and worried was measured. We 





interpretive style, endorse greater negative beliefs about uncertainty, and engage in worry to a 
greater extent than participants in a neutral condition.  
Method 
Participants 
 Our sample consisted of 77 undergraduate students who participated in the study in 
exchange for course credit or financial compensation. The average age of the sample was 22.88 
(SD = 4.96) years. The majority of participants were Caucasians (55.8%), 15.6% were Asian, 
7.8% were Black, 6.5% were Middle Eastern, 6.5% were multi-racial, 3.9% were Hispanic, and 
3.9% of our sample reported “other” as their ethnic origin. Most participants were female 
(81.80%), studied full-time (92.40%), and majored in psychology (56.10%). More than half of 
our sample was recruited from Concordia University (62.10%), whereas 37.9% were recruited 
from other universities in Montreal, Québec. 
Measures and Materials 
The Profile of Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971) was used to 
assess current levels of emotions, including anger, sadness, anxiety, fear, well-being, calmness, 
vigor, and fatigue. We used an abbreviated version containing 25 items based on a factor 
analysis by Usala and Hertzog (1989). Scores on the anger, sadness, anxiety, fear, well-being, 
calmness, and vigor subscales ranged from 0 – 15, and scores on the Fatigue subscale ranged 
from 0 – 20.  
The State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety – trait version (STICSA; 
Ree, French, MacLeod, & Locke, 2008) is a 21-item self-report questionnaire that assesses 
cognitive and somatic symptoms of anxiety. Items are assessed on a 4-point Likert scale ranging 





of anxiety. The STICSA has demonstrated construct, convergent, and discriminant validity 
(Grös, Antony, Simms, & McCabe, 2007). Internal consistency in the current sample was α = 
.88.  
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990) is a 16-item self-report 
measure that assesses the tendency to worry. Items are rated on a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(Not at all typical) to 5 (Very typical). Higher scores on the PSWQ reflect a greater tendency to 
worry. The PSWQ has demonstrated convergent and divergent validity, and test-retest reliability 
between eight to 10 weeks (r = .92). Internal consistency in the current sample was α = .94. 
The Trait Anger subscale (T-ANG) of the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 
(STAXI-2; Spielberger, 1999) is a 10-item scale that assesses the frequency and intensity of 
anger experiences. Items are rated on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (Almost never) to 4 (Almost 
always). Internal consistency in the current sample was α = .84. 
The Hostility subscale of the Aggression Questionnaire (AQ; Buss & Perry, 1992) is an 
8-item scale measuring the cognitive component of aggression, including feelings of injustice.  
Participants rate the extent to which each statement is characteristic or uncharacteristic of them 
on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (Extremely uncharacteristic of me) to 5 (Extremely 
characteristic of me). The AQ has good test-retest reliability over nine weeks (r = .80). Internal 
consistency for the hostility subscale (AQ-HOST) in the current sample was α = .72.  
Interpretive style. A scrambled sentence task (SST) was developed to examine 
interpretation styles associated with GAD (Donegan & Dugas, in prep; see Appendix B), based 
on the SST developed for social anxiety (Standage, Ashwin, & Fox, 2010). The task requires 
participants to rearrange scrambled sentences to form meaningful statements using only 5 of the 





“my date will be pleased”) or a negative sentence (e.g., “my date will be disappointed”). To 
increase cognitive load and thus reduce social desirability effects, participants begin by 
memorizing a 6-digit number over 10 seconds. After 6 minutes of unscrambling sentences, 
participants are instructed to recall the 6-digit number shown at the start of the task. This SST 
was developed to directly target the interpretive processing style underlying GAD, by including 
all major worry themes (academic, work, finances, social, health of self and others, and safety of 
self and others) and targeting both cost (inability to cope with threat) and likelihood (heightened 
perceived probability of negative events) estimates of common worry themes. For our analyses, 
we calculated the ratio of the number of negative sentences formed to the total number (positive 
and negative) of sentences formed. A score greater than .5 reflects more negative interpretations 
whereas a score of less than .5 reflects more positive interpretations. There were 40 sentences in 
total; 20 sentences were completed at baseline and the remaining 20 sentences were completed 
following the manipulation. The order of the two versions of the SST was counterbalanced.  
Beliefs about uncertainty. Negative beliefs about uncertainty were assessed using items 
from the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Buhr & Dugas, 2002). The IUS is a 27-item 
questionnaire that assesses individuals’ intolerance of uncertainty on a 5-point Likert scale, 
ranging from 1 (Not at all true of me) to 5 (Very much true of me). A two-factor structure for the 
IUS has been reported (Sexton & Dugas, 2009), with Factor 1 reflecting the belief that 
uncertainty has negative behavioural and self-referent implications (IU-1) and Factor 2 reflecting 
the belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything (IU-2). Higher scores on the IUS reflect 
greater negative beliefs about uncertainty. The IUS has been shown to have good test-retest 
reliability over five weeks (r = .74), and has demonstrated convergent and divergent validity 





consisting of 13 items. Counterbalanced across participants, one version was administered at 
baseline, and the other was administered following the manipulation. Items were selected for 
each version based on Factor 1 and Factor 2 item loadings, with an equal representation of strong 
loadings in both versions. One weak-loading item was omitted so that total scores on each 
version would be comparable.  
Worry. The Catastrophizing Interview is a well-validated structured worry task 
(Provencher, Freeston, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 2000; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992) that assesses 
various aspects of worrying and provides idiosyncratic content by using participant-generated 
worry themes. In the first phase of this interview, participants are asked to disclose their most 
severe worry theme. The experimenter then proceeds to the catastrophizing phase of the 
interview, which begins by asking “What is it about (worry) that worries you?” Once a response 
is provided, the experimenter asks “If (worry) were to happen, what are you afraid would 
happen next?” This question is repeated in response to the previous answer until the participant 
cannot generate any more feared consequences. Participants then rate the likelihood of each 
catastrophizing step on a scale from 1 (Not at all likely) to 100 (Extremely likely), and the 
severity of each catastrophizing step on a scale from 1 (Not at all severe) to 8 (Extremely severe). 
Three variables are thus derived from this task: the number of catastrophizing steps, the average 
likelihood of steps, and the average severity of steps.  
Manipulation check. Heart rate (beats per minute) was measured continuously 
throughout the study using a Polar Heart Rate monitor (Polar RS800CX) to assess physiological 
reactivity to the manipulation. The POMS was used to assess current anger as well as other 







 Participants were recruited from Concordia University’s Psychology Department 
Participant Pool or from advertisements placed at a nearby university. They were informed that 
the goal of the study was to examine how personality variables affect reactions to various mental 
tasks as well as cardiac activity. After providing written consent to participate (see Appendix C), 
participants completed a series of questionnaires assessing anger (T-ANG), hostility (AQ-
HOST), negative beliefs about uncertainty (IUS), and worry (PSWQ). They also completed the 
SST, and were then randomly assigned to an anger induction (n = 43) or a control condition (n = 
34). We randomized a greater number of participants to the anger induction condition to offset 
for the possibility that some participants might not become angry in response to the hostile 
interaction and would therefore be excluded prior to analyses (see below), and to compensate for 
the possibility that participants may refuse to continue the study following the hostile interaction 
(which did not occur). The dependent measures (i.e., the SST, the IUS, and the Catastrophizing 
Interview) were administered following the manipulation by the first experimenter, who was 
blind to participant condition.  
For our anger manipulation, we used an ecologically-valid anger-induction paradigm 
involving a hostile interaction with a second experimenter (e.g., Neumann et al., 2011; Suarez, 
Harlan, Peoples, & Williams, 1993; Suarez & Williams, 1989). Following the completion of 
baseline measures, a heart rate monitor was attached to participants. Participants were informed 
there would be a 5-minute rest period to obtain resting heart rate. In each condition, at the end of 
the 5 minute rest period, the experimenter walked down the hallway past the participant’s room 
and asked a research assistant to complete the next task as she had to step out for a few moments. 





conversation. The research assistant then entered the participant’s room to announce that she 
would be taking over until the experimenter returned from a brief impromptu meeting. In the 
hostile condition, the research assistant announced her displeasure about having to do this (e.g., 
“Hi I’m (Name), the experimenter told me to continue testing for her since she had to step out for 
a moment, so it looks like I’m stuck having to do this now. Hopefully she won’t be too long, but 
whatever, let’s just get started with the first task”).  In the control condition, she simply 
announced her presence.  
In both conditions, the participants completed a task consisting of five-letter solvable 
anagrams presented on Microsoft PowerPoint and participants were asked to verbalize their 
answers. Participants solved as many anagrams as possible for 6 minutes, and were informed that 
the top 40% of those who solved the most correct anagrams would be entered in a draw to win 
$50 (all participants were entered in this draw). In the anger condition, the research assistant 
delivered 8 standardized harassing statements at 30-second intervals during the 6-minute task 
(e.g., “You have 4 minutes remaining. You will need to try harder if you want to be entered in 
the draw”). In the neutral condition, the research assistant simply stated the remaining time in the 
task at 30-second intervals. As a manipulation check, participants completed the POMS 
immediately following the task. The experimenter then returned, apologized for her absence, and 
administered the tasks assessing the study’s dependent variables. The tasks included another 
SST, IUS items, and the Catastrophizing Interview. The SST and the IUS were administered in a 
counterbalanced order across participants. The Catastrophizing Interview was always the final 
task administered. The length of the interview differs across participants, and if administered 
prior to other tasks, the duration of the interview may have confounded the results. Also, given 





interview as the final task prevented any possible affective changes taking place during the 
interview from interfering with the other tasks. Finally participants were debriefed and for 
participants in the anger induction condition (see Appendix D for post-study consent form), the 
“hostile” research assistant returned to introduce herself and thank them for their participation. 
Results 
The anger induction led to greater self-reported anger and physiological arousal relative 
to the control condition, suggesting that our manipulation was successful. Specifically, those in 
the anger condition reported significantly greater state anger on the POMS (M = 2.67, SD = 2.84) 
following the anagram task than those in the control group (M = .53, SD = .93), t(52.88
2
) = - 
4.64, p < .001, and had a higher mean heart rate immediately following the anagram task (M = 




To examine the specificity of our anger manipulation relative to other emotions, we 
conducted additional t-tests between conditions on the different subscales of the POMS. There 
were no significant between-group differences following the manipulation on depression, 
anxiety, fear, well-being, calmness, or vigor (ps > .12). There was, however, a between-group 
difference on level of fatigue following the manipulation, such that the neutral condition reported 
higher levels of fatigue than the anger condition, t(75) = 2.33, p = .02. This finding was not 
surprising however, as state anger is an emotion associated with elevated physiological arousal 
(e.g., Lobbestael, Arntz, & Wiers, 2008).  
                                                 
2
 Degrees of freedom were corrected to account for the violated assumption of homogeneity of 
variance (assessed by Levine’s test of equality of variance, p < .001). 
3
 Hardware malfunction led to inaccurate heart rate recordings for 17 participants. The excluded 
participants did not differ from the included participants on socio-demographic variables or 





Given that our hypotheses were that state anger would affect subsequent worry and 
cognitive processes, only participants who responded to the anger induction were included in the 
main analyses. That is, participants in the anger condition who did not experience an increase in 
anger following the hostile interaction were excluded. To be included, participants in the anger 
induction group were required to report an increase of at least 1-point on the POMS from 
baseline to post-induction (11 participants were excluded from the anger induction group). A 
difference of 1-point on the POMS is greater than the standard deviation of the POMS-anger 
subscale at baseline. Our final sample included 66 participants (n = 32 in the anger condition, n = 
34 in the control condition). With our final sample, participants in the anger condition did not 
differ from participants in the control condition on socio-demographic features (i.e., age, sex, or 
education year), recruitment type, or trait psychological variables measured at baseline (i.e., 
negative beliefs about uncertainty, trait anxiety, worry, trait anger, or hostility) prior to the 
manipulation (ps > .10). See Table 8 for correlations between trait psychological variables 
measured at baseline.  
To test our hypothesis that the anger induction would lead to greater negative interpretive 
style, we conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with condition as the 
between-subjects factor and scores on the SST task before and after the manipulation as the 
within-subjects factor. There was no main effect of group or main effect of time. However in 
support of our hypotheses, we found a significant interaction between group and time such that 
greater increases in negative interpretations of the scramble sentences from baseline to post-
manipulation were observed in the anger condition relative to the control condition, F(1, 64) = 
5.60, p = .02, ηp
2







Correlations between Trait-Level Psychological Variables Measured At Baseline (N = 77) 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7   
1. PSWQ  1.00  .51**  .65**  .55**  .52**  .53** .31** 
2. IU-1 – baseline   1.00  .63**  .64**  .39**  .53** .27* 
3. IU-2 – baseline    1.00  .43**  .46**  .48** .30** 
4. STICSA-Trait      1.00  .52**  .60** .34** 
5. STAXI-2-Trait      1.00  .60** .25* 
6. AQ-Hostility       1.00 .30** 
7. SST- baseline        1.00 
Notes: PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; IU-1 = Factor-1 Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Scale (belief that uncertainty has negative behavioural and self-referent implications); IU-2 = 
Factor-2 Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything); 
STICSA = State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety; STAXI-2 = State-Trait 
Anger Expression Inventory, second edition; AQ-HOST = Aggression Questionnaire – Hostility 
Subscale; SST = Scrambled Sentence Task, assessed at baseline; HR-baseline = heart rate (beats 
per minute) assessed at baseline.  









Means and Standard Deviations per Condition before and after the Manipulation  
 Neutral  Anger 
 Pre  Post  Pre  Post 
 M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)    
POMS-Anger  .47 (1.35)  .53 (0.93)  .38 (0.94)  3.59 (2.75) 
HR  76.54 (11.69)  78.00  (11.26)  79.81  (9.82)  89.39  (14.30)  
IU-1  16.62  (5.42)  16.76  (6.25)  15.97  (4.28)  15.19  (4.97)  
IU-2  18.15  (5.00) 16.97  (5.19)  16.69  (4.49)   17.56  (5.02)  
SST  .25  (.15)  .21  (.15)  .19  (.17)  .23  (.16)  
CI-Steps --  6.21 (2.63) --  7.00  (2.81)  
CI-Likelihood --  59.32  (18.75) --  55.65  (15.80)  
CI-Severity --  5.86  (1.10) --  6.11  (1.07)  
Notes: POMS-Anger = Profile of Mood States, Anger subscale; HR = heart rate, measured in 
beats per minute; IU-1 = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-Factor-1 (belief that uncertainty has 
negative behavioural and self-referent implications); IU-2 = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-
Factor-2 (belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything); SST = Scrambled Sentence 






To test our hypothesis that the anger induction would lead to greater negative beliefs 
about uncertainty, we conducted two repeated measures ANOVAs with condition as the 
between-subjects factor and scores on IU-1 and IU-2 from baseline and post-manipulation 
assessments as the within-subject factors. There was no main effect of group or main effect of 
time, and we found no group by time interaction on changes in IU-1 from baseline to post-
manipulation, F(1, 64) = 1.51, p = .22, ηp
2
 = .02; however we found a significant interaction with 
IU-2, such that greater increases in IU-2 from baseline to post-manipulation were found in the 
anger condition relative to the control condition, F(1, 64) = 6.16, p = .02, ηp
2
 = .09.  
Finally, to test our hypothesis that anger would lead to greater worry relative to a neutral 
condition, we conducted three separate one-way ANOVAs with condition as our between-subject 
factor and the Catastrophizing Interview variables as the dependent measures (i.e., number of 
steps, and perceived likelihood and severity of steps). However, we found no between-group 
differences on the Catastrophizing Interview variables. Specifically, there were no between-
group differences on the number of steps, F(1, 64) = 1.41, p = .24, ηp
2
 = .02, the average 
likelihood of the steps, F(1, 64) = 0.73, p = .40, ηp
2
 = .01, or the average perceived severity of 
the steps, F (1, 64) = 0.86, p = .36, ηp
2
 = .01.  Table 9 presents means and standard deviations 
within our final sample for baseline and post-manipulation measures of state anger, heart rate, 
IU-1, IU-2, and the SST, as well as the Catastrophizing Interview variables. 
Discussion 
The goal of the study was to examine the effects of induced anger on worry and 
associated cognitive vulnerabilities, including negative interpretive style and negative beliefs 
about uncertainty. Overall, our hypotheses were partially supported. We found that participants 





belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything, relative to participants in the control 
condition. However, no effects were found with the belief that uncertainty has negative 
behavioural and self-referent implications or with worry. These findings provide partial support 
for the notion that state anger perpetuates some of the cognitive vulnerability factors underlying 
GAD, and therefore may partially account for the association between anger and GAD.  
Our finding that induced anger increased threatening interpretations of ambiguous stimuli 
is consistent with previous literature (e.g., Barazzone & Davey, 2009; Wenzel & Lystad, 2005), 
and suggests that when individuals are angry, their interpretive style resembles that of anxious 
individuals. Barazzone and Davey (2009) found that manipulating state anger using anger-
eliciting music and vignettes led to a greater likelihood of spelling ambiguous homophone words 
in a negative manner compared to a control condition. In contrast to their study, we used an 
anger-induction paradigm that reduces social desirability effects and increases ecological 
validity, and used an interpretation task that was tailored for GAD. Therefore, these findings 
extend the current literature on the effects of anger on interpretive style by replicating recent 
findings using a “naturalistic” anger induction and providing a GAD framework.  
In addition, although this was the first study to examine the direct impact of state anger 
on beliefs about uncertainty, our findings are in line with previous reports of associations 
between trait anger and negative beliefs about uncertainty (Fracalanza et al., 2014; Radomsky et 
al., 2007). We found that participants in the anger condition endorsed the belief that uncertainty 
is unfair and spoils everything to a greater extent than participants in the control condition. 
Similarly, Fracalanza and colleagues (2014) found that this belief uniquely mediated the 
association between externalized anger and GAD symptoms, as well as hostility and GAD 





why the belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything was endorsed to a greater extent in 
the experimental condition than the control condition relates to the nature of the manipulation. 
Specifically, the hostile interaction may have been perceived by participants as unfair. Given that 
a determinant of anger is the attribution of unfairness (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), beliefs 
about unfairness, which can include the belief that uncertainty is unfair, may have been primed 
to a greater extent than the belief that uncertainty has negative behavioural and self-referent 
implications.   
We expected that the anger induction would lead to increased worry; however we did not 
find any effects of the manipulation on the worry process assessed by the Catastrophizing 
Interview. One explanation for these null findings is that any effects of the anger induction 
dissipated prior to the administration of the Catastrophizing Interview, given that the interview 
was the final dependent measure administered. Possibly, significant results may have emerged if 
worry was assessed immediately after the manipulation. Therefore, it is necessary to explore this 
possibility further using a study design that assesses worry immediately following an anger 
induction. At the moment, it is unclear how state anger directly affects worry.  
Despite the strengths of our study, which include the use of an ecologically-valid anger 
induction procedure, certain limitations should be noted. First, our findings are limited by the use 
of a non-clinical sample. To better understand the mechanisms underlying the association 
between anger and GAD, the direct effect of state anger should be examined in a clinically 
anxious population. Second, it is unclear from this study whether anger directly leads to greater 
negative interpretive style and beliefs that uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything, or whether 
general negative affect produced by the hostile interaction triggered these effects. To clarify 





depressive mood induction on subsequent cognitive vulnerabilities. Finally, our effect sizes 
regarding the impact of state anger on GAD-related cognitive processes were relatively small, 
which highlights the need for replication.   
To conclude, this study provides partial support for the notion that anger contributes to 
cognitive vulnerabilities underlying GAD, by intensifying negative interpretive style and specific 
negative beliefs about uncertainty. From a broader perspective, our findings are also consistent 
with the notion that cognitive vulnerabilities can be affected by emotional states. Although 
cognitive accounts of emotion (Clark & Beck, 2010; Lazarus, 1991) propose that cognitions are 
necessary for the experience of emotions, our findings are in line with the theories proposing that 
cognition and emotion are independent interrelated systems (Zajonc, 1984), and that affective 
states can subsequently affect judgments and thought processes (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). From 
a clinical perspective, our findings offer preliminary support for the idea that anger may obstruct 
attempts at generating alternative appraisals for potentially threatening ambiguous events or 
attempts to decrease negative beliefs about uncertainty, both of which are components of 








Results from study 2 demonstrate that induced state anger potentiates, at least to some 
extent, cognitive factors associated with GAD. The cognitive factors impacted were the belief 
that uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything and threatening interpretations of ambiguous 
stimuli. An important step in furthering our understanding of the nature of the association 
between anger and GAD is to examine whether worry impacts anger-related cognitive processing 
style. For instance, individuals with high trait anger tend to interpret ambiguously hostile 
behaviours as deliberate and purposeful (e.g., Hazebroek et al., 2001; Owen, 2011). A goal of 
study 3 was to examine the effect of a worry induction, compared to a relaxation induction, on 
hostile interpretations of ambiguous intent. The cross-over effects of anger and worry on 
cognitive processes involved in GAD and high trait anger were also examined in study 3. 
Therefore, an anger induction was also included in study 3 and the effects of induced anger on 
threatening interpretations of ambiguous information were compared to a relaxation induction. 
Finally, we examined whether GAD analogues reported greater hostile interpretations of 
ambiguous intent and whether GAD analogue status interacted with the worry and anger 










AN INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF WORRY AND ANGER ON 
THREATENING INTERPRETATIONS AND HOSTILE ATTRIBUTIONS OF 
AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS 
A number of studies have demonstrated that anger, an emotion that varies in intensity 
from mild irritability to intense fury and rage (Spielberger, 1988), is associated with generalized 
anxiety disorder (GAD), a disorder characterized by excessive worry and anxiety (American 
Psychiatric Association [APA] 2000, 2013). Erdem and colleagues (2008) found that relative to 
non-anxious individuals, those with GAD reported higher trait anger, outward anger expression, 
and anger suppression, as well as lower anger control. In addition, Deschênes and colleagues 
(2012) found that elevated trait anger, hostility, and anger suppression predicted greater GAD 
symptom severity.  
Two large epidemiological investigations using nationally-representative samples in the 
United States (Hawkins & Cougle, 2011) and Australia (Barrett, Mills, & Teesson, 2013) have 
demonstrated that a diagnosis of GAD is associated with elevated anger. Specifically, Hawkins 
and Cougle (2011) found that GAD was related to greater anger experience over the past 30 
days, and this relationship remained after controlling for socio-demographic features and 
comorbid diagnoses, including other anxiety disorders, bipolar disorder, substance abuse 
disorders, depression, and borderline personality disorder. Similarly, Barrett and colleagues 
(2013) found that GAD was related to greater anger severity over the past 30 days, controlling 
for socio-demographic features, comorbid anxiety disorders, mood and bipolar disorders, and 
substance use disorders. Together, these studies suggest that elevated anger seems to characterize 





Research investigating the mechanisms underlying the association between anger and 
symptoms of GAD is scarce. One possibility is that shared underlying information-processing 
styles are associated with both anger and anxiety or worry responses. Many studies support the 
notion that biased information processing (e.g., more negative) is an important factor 
contributing to the etiology and maintenance of GAD symptomology. For instance, individuals 
with GAD or elevated trait anxiety are quicker to attend to threatening information (MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Williams, Mathews, & Hirsch, 2014) and 
interpret ambiguous information as more threatening (Eysenck et al., 1991; Eysenck, MacLeod, 
& Mathews, 1987; Mathews et al., 1989) than non-anxious individuals. Recent studies have 
demonstrated that modifying information processing style to either increase attention to non-
threatening information (Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009) or to facilitate benign 
interpretations (Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs, & Mathews, 2010) leads to reductions in GAD symptoms.  
Some studies also suggest that anger is related to cognitive vulnerabilities associated with 
GAD. For instance, Fracalanza and colleagues (2014) found that intolerance of uncertainty, a 
cognitive vulnerability for GAD (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007), mediated the relationship between 
GAD symptoms and trait anger. Similarly, Deschênes, Dugas, Anderson, and Gouin (2014) 
found that inducing state anger using a naturalistic insult paradigm led to increases in intolerance 
of uncertainty. They also found that the state anger induction led to increases in threatening 
interpretations of ambiguous sentences, which indicates that anger is also related to information 
processing styles characteristic of individuals with GAD. Similarly, Barazzone and Davey 
(2009) found that laboratory-induced state anger led to increases in threatening interpretations of 
ambiguous homophone words. Together these findings suggest that elevations in anger impact 





Certain information processing styles also contribute to elevated anger. For example, 
following provocation, individuals with high trait anger attend to anger-related words more 
rapidly than individuals with low trait anger (Eckardt & Cohen, 1997; Van Honk et al. 2001). 
High trait anger is also associated with the tendency to perceive the intent of others in situations 
that lead to negative outcomes as deliberately hostile (Hazebroek et al., 2001). In accordance, a 
computerized training program aimed at reducing such hostile attributions led to greater 
decreases in anger in response to an insult than a computerized training program aimed at 
increasing hostile interpretations (Hawkins & Cougle, 2013). These findings suggest that hostile 
interpretations of ambiguous social interactions are more pronounced in angry versus non-angry 
individuals (see Owen, 2011, and Wilkowski & Robinson, 2010, for reviews). 
A limited number of studies have examined the associations between trait anxiety and 
information processing styles associated with high trait anger. These studies generally suggest 
that elevated trait anxiety is indeed associated with anger-related cognitive processes. For 
instance, when examining naturally-occurring thought content in reaction to daily emotional 
experiences, Wickless and Kirsch (1988) found that although the strongest associations were 
seen between the emotional experience (i.e., anger, anxiety, or sadness) and the emotion-
congruent thought content (i.e., transgressions, threat, and loss, respectively), anxiety was 
associated with increased thoughts of transgressions. In addition, Byrne and Eysenck (1995) 
found that low trait anxiety was associated with a slower latency to detect angry faces from a set 
of happy faces. These studies provide evidence suggesting that elevated anxiety is associated 
with cognitive factors underlying trait anger such as hostile thoughts and biased attention 
towards anger-related stimuli. However, Van Honk et al. (2001) found that although trait anger 





failed to find that trait anxiety predicted greater attention to angry faces. Further research is 
needed on the association between trait anxiety and information processing biases associated 
with high trait anger.   
Taken together, there is some correlational and experimental evidence suggesting that 
elevated anger is related to information processing styles underlying GAD symptoms, and that 
GAD symptoms are related to information processing styles underlying high trait anger. It is 
currently unknown, however, whether worry directly increases information processing styles 
associated with anger. Therefore, the goal of this study was to experimentally increase worry to 
examine the effects on hostile attribution bias. In addition, we aimed to replicate previous 
findings by examining whether induced anger leads to greater threat-related interpretation bias. 
These effects were compared to a relaxation control condition. We hypothesized that relative to a 
relaxation condition, both worry and anger would lead to greater threatening interpretations of 
ambiguous situations and to greater hostile attributions.   
We also explored whether GAD analogues (i.e., participants who met diagnostic criteria 
for GAD by self-report) had a greater likelihood of exhibiting a negative information processing 
style than less anxious participants, and whether this effect would be enhanced in the worry and 
anger conditions relative to the relaxation condition. Individuals with GAD tend to have different 
information processing styles (e.g., more biased towards negative information/interpretations) 
than non-anxious individuals (e.g., Eysenck, et al., 1991; Mathews et al., 1989). Cognitive theory 
suggests that this tendency is more pronounced when cognitive vulnerabilities become activated; 
such as in stressful situations or following a mood or worry induction (see Clark & Beck, 2010). 





hostile attributions than less anxious individuals, and that these effects would be increased in the 
worry or anger conditions relative to the relaxation condition.  
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and fifty (N = 150) psychology undergraduate students, recruited from the 
institutional participant pool, participated in exchange for course credits. The average age of the 
sample was 22.68 (SD = 4.57) years and the majority of participants were female (n = 123; 
82%). Ninety-eight participants (65.3%) were White, 20 (13.3%) were Middle Eastern, 11 
(7.3%) were Multi-Racial, 9 (6%) were Asian, 8 (5.3%) were Hispanic, 3 (2%) were Black, and 
one (0.7%) participant reported “other” as their ethnic origin.  
Materials 
Current affective state. State levels of anxiety, worry, anger, sadness, happiness, and 
relaxation were assessed using 100 mm visual analogue scales (VAS). Higher scores represent a 
greater intensity of each affective state.  
Measures of GAD symptoms. The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 
1990) is a 16-item measure that assesses the general tendency to worry on a 5-point Likert Scale 
ranging from 1 (Not at all typical) to 5 (Very typical). Scores can range from 16 to 80, with 
higher scores reflecting a greater propensity to worry. The PSWQ has demonstrated convergent 
and divergent validity, test-retest reliability over eight to ten weeks (r = .92), and excellent 
internal consistency in our sample (α = .93).  
The State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety – Trait scale (STICSA-T; 
Ree et al., 2008) is a 21-item self-report measure that assesses the general tendency to experience 





Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 4 (Very much so). Scores can range from 21 to 84, 
with higher scores reflecting greater trait anxiety. The STICSA-T demonstrates construct, 
convergent, and discriminant validity (Grös, Antony, Simms, & McCabe, 2007), and we found 
good internal consistency in our sample (α = .89). 
The Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 2002) is a 
14-item self-report screening tool developed to assess the presence of GAD based on DSM-IV 
(APA, 2000) diagnostic criteria. No changes were made to the symptoms of GAD in the latest 
revision of the DSM (i.e., DSM-5; APA, 2013); as such, the GAD-Q-IV assesses current 
conceptualizations of GAD symptomology. Items are rated either dichotomously (presence or 
absence of symptoms) or on the degree of interference and distress produced by the symptoms 
on a Likert scale ranging from 0 (None) to 8 (Very severe). Scores can range from 0-13, with 
higher scores reflecting greater GAD symptomology. Scores of 5.7 and above indicate the 
presence of GAD and scores below 5.7 indicate the absence of GAD, based on recommendations 
from Newman et al. (2002). With this cut-score, participants in our sample meeting GAD 
diagnostic criteria (i.e., GAD-analogue group; n = 41) reported significantly greater worry 
assessed by the PSWQ (M = 62.83, SD = 9.03) than participants not meeting diagnostic criteria 
for GAD (i.e., non-GAD group; n = 109) (M = 47.43, SD= 11.97), t(148) = -7.47, p < .001. The 
GAD-analogue group also reported significantly greater trait anxiety assessed by the STICSA (M 
= 44.54, SD = 8.19) than the non-GAD group (M = 32.35, SD = 6.73), t(148) = -9.31, p < .001.  
Dependent variables. The Ambiguous Unambiguous Situations Diary (AUSD; Davey et 
al., 1992; Koerner & Dugas, 2008) assesses interpretations of ambiguous situations as 
threatening or benign. The original version (Davey et al.) consists of positive, negative, and 





events, we omitted the positive and negative scenarios from the study and retained only the 
ambiguous scenarios (AUSD-A). As such, the modified version of the AUSD (Koerner & 
Dugas) contains 22 ambiguous passages (i.e., where the outcome of the situation can be 
positive/neutral, or threatening/negative), resembling diary entries written in the first person 
(e.g., “Today, I was on the bus when I noticed some of my classmates sitting behind me, talking 
with each other in a low voice”). The worry domains covered in the scenarios include social 
relationships, academic and work performance, finances, personal health and health of others, 
physical danger, the future, and self-concept. Participants rate their perceived level of concern 
for each scenario on a scale from 1 (Not at all concerned) to 5 (Extremely concerned). Scores 
can range from 22 to 110, with greater concern reflecting greater threatening interpretations of 
the ambiguous scenarios.  
The Social Information Processing–Attribution and Emotional Response Questionnaire 
(SIP–AEQ; Coccaro, Noblett, & McCloskey, 2009) assesses attributional and emotional 
responses to aversive, socially ambiguous situations involving one or more provocateurs. For the 
purpose of this study, only attributional responses were examined. The SIP-AEQ contains eight 
vignettes describing an aversive situation (e.g., “You and a group of your co-workers went on a 
business trip. While at the hotel, waiting to meet a customer, you stop to buy a cup of coffee. 
Suddenly, one of your co-workers bumps your arm and spills your coffee over your shirt. The 
coffee is hot and your shirt is wet”). For each vignette, the perceived likelihood of direct hostile 
intent as the cause of the situation (e.g., “My co-worker wanted to burn me with the hot coffee”) 
and the perceived likelihood of benign intent (e.g., “My co-worker did it by accident”) are rated 





scale can range from 0 to 24, with higher scores reflecting greater hostile attributions or greater 
benign attributions, respectively.  
Procedure 
To mask the true purpose of the study, participants were invited to take part in a study 
examining how thoughts about past or future events affect interpersonal behaviour. After 
providing informed consent (see Appendix E), participants completed a series of questionnaires, 
including a socio-demographic form, PSWQ, STICSA-T, and GAD-Q-IV. They also completed 
pre- and post-manipulation state affect measures using VASs.  
Following the completion of baseline measures, participants were instructed to rest for a 
5-minute period and were then randomly assigned to one of three conditions: the worry induction 
condition (n = 51), the anger induction condition (n = 50), or the relaxation condition (n = 49). 
The manipulation was used to produce affective changes in worry and anxiety, anger, and 
positive mood and relaxation, respectively. The manipulation instructions were as follows; for 
the worry condition, participants were instructed to pick their most worrisome topic and worry 
about it as intensely as possible for five minutes, focusing on the consequences of the feared 
outcome if it were to happen (adapted from Fisher & Newman, 2013). For the anger condition, 
we used an anger rumination task adapted from Waldstein et al. (2000). Participants were 
instructed to think about an unresolved incident that made them feel very angry, frustrated, or 
irritated for five minutes, and to try to mentally recreate the incident from beginning to end, 
focusing on what was said and done, the location, the person or persons involved, and how they 
felt during the incident. For the relaxation condition, participants were instructed to relax as 
much as possible and to shift their focus onto their breathing for five minutes, as well as to try to 





and Newman (2013). Following the manipulation, dependent measures were administered on a 
computer and consisted of assessing threat interpretation bias using the AUSD-A and assessing 
hostile attribution bias using the SIP–AEQ, which were administered in a counterbalanced order. 
Participants were debriefed at the end of the study (see Appendix F for post-study consent form).  
Results 
Data Screening and Randomization Checks 
 All data were normally distributed (skewness values < 3.0 and kurtosis values < 10.0; 
Kline, 2009). To examine whether randomization was successful, we compared groups on 
baseline measures of trait and state psychological characteristics. As expected, the groups did not 
differ on measures of state affect upon arrival to the laboratory. In addition, there were no main 
effects of condition on the PSWQ, F(2, 147) = 0.92, p = .40, ɳp
2
 = .01, but there was a marginal 
effect of group on the STICSA-T, F(2, 147) = 2.34, p = .10, ɳp
2
 = .03. Pairwise comparisons 
indicated that participants in the worry induction condition (M = 33.76, SD = 8.07) had 
significantly lower trait anxiety than participants in the relaxation condition (M = 37.61, SD = 
9.46), p = .03. As such, the STICSA-T was entered as a covariate in our primary analyses. See 
Table 1 for means and standard deviations on the VASs.  
Manipulation Checks 
To examine the specificity of our manipulation on current psychological states measured 
by the VASs, we conducted a series of 2X3 mixed factorial analyses of variance (ANOVAs) 
with VAS before and after the manipulation as the repeated factor and condition as the between-
groups factor (see Table 10 for means and standard deviations). As expected, we found a 






Means and Standard Deviations per Condition for Visual Analogue Scales Administered Pre and 
Post Manipulation 
  Condition  
 Worry  Anger  Relaxation 
 M  SD  M  SD  M  SD  
Measure and Time 
Worry* 
 Pre  17.41  18.48  28.22  23.57  18.92
 
  20.93 
 Post 52.41 24.43 36.80 25.18 14.88 20.68 
Anger* 
 Pre 4.59 6.36 5.28 8.76 4.51 10.12 
 Post 15.49 19.81 31.96 23.76 3.31 7.58 
Anxiety*  
 Pre 15.33 16.84 15.26 16.90 18.45a 22.09  
 Post 42.71 23.57 31.44 22.45 13.49d 19.21 
Sadness* 
 Pre 12.43 16.11 10.54 16.17 10.27 19.02 
 Post 27.33 26.43 28.40 27.36 8.71 17.01 
Relaxation* 
 Pre 67.90 22.52 68.58 19.90 68.14 24.57 
 Post 34.45 20.87 42.94 24.47 72.98 25.44 
Happiness* 
 Pre 62.71 22.90 63.90 22.14 60.29 17.82 
 Post 46.76 22.86 48.54 25.10 62.80 18.12 
Notes: Groups did not differ on any state measure baseline (ps > .27). All changes from 
pre to post manipulation within each condition were statistically significant (ps ≤ .05), with the 
exception of changes in anger within the relaxation condition (p = .08). * indicates a significant 





60.75, p < .001, ɳp
2 
= .45, anger, F(2,147) = 33.99, p < .001, ɳp
2 
= .32, and relaxation, F(2, 147) 
= 46.97, p < .001, ɳp
2 
= .39. 
Follow-up comparisons demonstrated that participants in both the worry and the anger 
conditions experienced greater increases in worry, anxiety, anger, and sadness, as well as greater 
decreases in relaxation and happiness (all ps < .001), than participants in the relaxation 
condition. Participants in the worry and anger conditions did not significantly differ from each 
other on changes in relaxation (p = .08), happiness (p = .86), or sadness (p = .47); however as 
expected, participants in the worry induction condition experienced greater increases in worry (p 
< .001) and anxiety (p = .003) than those in the anger induction condition, whereas participants 
in the anger condition experienced greater increases in anger (p < .001) than those in the worry 
condition. These results suggest that the manipulation was successful in increasing current levels 
of worry in the worry induction condition, anger in the anger condition, and relaxation in the 
relaxation condition.  
Effects of the Experimental Manipulation on Information Processing  
To examine the impact of the manipulation on threat-related interpretation bias, we 
conducted a one-way factorial analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with condition as the between- 
groups factor, STICSA-T scores as the covariate, and the AUSD-A as the outcome variable. 
Unexpectedly, there was no significant main effect of condition on the AUSD-A, F(2, 146) = 
2.05, p = .13, ɳp
2 
= .03 (see Figure 1, panel A). Next, we examined the effects of the 
manipulation on attributions of intent towards negative situations using a one-way multivariate 
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with condition as the between-groups factor, STICSA 










Figure 1. Means (standard errors) per experimental condition on the Ambiguous Unambiguous 
Situations Diary, Ambiguous subscale (A) and the Social Information Processing-Attribution and 
Emotional Response Questionnaire, Direct Hostile Intent and Benign Intent subscales (B). 
Means are adjusted for trait anxiety measured by the State Trait Inventory for Cognitive and 































outcome variables. There was no main effect of condition on the combined SIP-AEQ variables, 
Λ = 0.98, F(4, 292) = .76, p = .55, ηp² = .01 (see Figure 1, panel B). These results indicate that 
our hypotheses that anger and worry would increase threatening interpretations of ambiguous 
information and hostile attributions relative to relaxation were unsupported.  
GAD and Information Processing  
To examine the effects of GAD status and the interaction between GAD status and 
condition on threat-related interpretation bias, we conducted a 2X3 two-way ANOVA with GAD 
status (GAD-analogue or non-GAD) and condition (worry, anger, or relaxation) as between-
groups factors, and the AUSD-A as the outcome variable. There was a main effect of GAD status 
on the AUSD-A, F(1, 144) = 34.04, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .19, suggesting that the GAD-analogue group 
had greater negative interpretations of ambiguous situations (M = 79.02, SD = 12.84) than the 
non-GAD group (M = 64.77, SD = 13.50). However, there was no interaction between GAD 
status and condition on the AUSD-A, F(2, 144) = 1.38, p = .25, ɳp
2
 = .02 (see Figure 2, panel A). 
To examine the effects of the manipulation on a composite of hostile attributions of intent, we 
conducted a two-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with condition and GAD 
status as the between-groups factors and the SIP-AEQ variables as the outcome variables. There 
was a main effect of GAD status on the combined SIP-AEQ variables, Λ = 0.85, F(2, 143) = 
12.69, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .15. However, there was no interaction between GAD status and condition 
on the combined SIP-AEQ variables, Λ = 0.99, F(4, 286) = .52, p = .73, ɳp
2
 = .01 (see Figure 2, 
panel B).  
A discriminant function analysis was conducted to examine the relative contribution of 
each SIP-AEQ variable to GAD group status. The correlations between the predictors and the 










Figure 2. Means (standard errors) per GAD group and experimental condition on the Ambiguous 







































Attribution and Emotional Response Questionnaire, Direct Hostile Intent and Benign Intent 
subscales (B). Sample sizes per condition for the GAD-analogue group are n = 13 for worry, n = 
12 for anger, and n = 16 for relaxation; sample sizes per condition for the non-GAD group are n 
= 38 for worry, n = 38 for anger, and n = 33 for relaxation. * p < .05, ** p < .01, 
† 





.99) in GAD group status than lower benign attributions (r = -.37). Using Jackknife 
classification, the discriminant function correctly classified 68% (n = 102) of individuals into 
their respective GAD groups, with 70.70% (n = 29) correctly classified as GAD-analogue and 
67% (n = 73) correctly classified as non-GAD. Collectively, these results suggest that relative to 
the non-GAD group, the GAD-analogue group reported greater interpretations of threat 
regarding ambiguous situations and attributed greater hostile intent to the provocateurs of the 
aversive situations, independent of the emotional induction.  
Discussion 
The goals of the study were to compare the effects of induced worry, anger, and 
relaxation on threatening interpretations of ambiguous situations and hostile attributions of 
ambiguous intent in aversive situations. Contrary to our hypotheses, there were no effects of the 
experimental conditions on interpretive or attributional styles. To further explore the association 
between GAD and anger, we also examined the information processing style of GAD analogues. 
The GAD-analogue group interpreted ambiguous situations as more threatening and attributed 
greater hostile intent to the ambiguous aversive situations than the non-GAD group. However, in 
contrast to our hypothesis, there were no interactions between GAD status and condition on the 
information processing tasks.  
Many studies have reported that GAD symptoms are associated with a hyper-vigilance 
for threat in ambiguous situations (e.g., Eysenck et al., 1987; Mathews et al., 1989); thus our 
finding that the GAD group reported more concern over ambiguous diary passages is consistent 
with previous literature. This is the first study that we are aware of, however, to examine the 
effects of GAD symptoms on hostile attributions. We found that GAD analogues attributed 





ambiguous. Therefore, the tendency for individuals with GAD to resolve ambiguity in a negative 
manner extends to hostile attributions. This may be due to greater rigidity in negative 
information processing styles in GAD analogues than in less anxious individuals. Importantly, 
this is a stable, intransient effect that is largely unaffected by current affective state, given that 
information processing style was unaffected by the emotional induction.  
Methodological constraints may partially explain the null findings regarding the effect of 
the manipulation on information processing. One possibility is that participants may not have 
wanted to report hostile attributions due to social desirability concerns. Another possibility is that 
the effects of the worry and anger inductions dissipated over the course of the administration of 
our information processing tasks. Participants completed a set of VASs prior to these tasks, and 
the tasks together took between 15 to 20 minutes to complete. As such, it is possible that the 
effects of our relatively mild emotion inductions were reduced over time. Perhaps more powerful 
emotion inductions are necessary to have a longer lasting influence on information processing 
(e.g., Barazzone & Davey, 2009; Deschênes et al., 2014).  
Several limitations to our study are noteworthy. First, we used a self-report measure to 
assess GAD diagnostic criteria. Although our GAD group had greater worry and trait anxiety 
levels than our non-GAD group, these individuals may differ from a clinical sample in the 
amount of distress resulting from their GAD symptoms. Future research should aim to replicate 
this finding with a clinician-diagnosed sample of individuals with GAD. Second, although the 
manipulation checks suggested that the worry, anger, and relaxation inductions were successful, 
it is possible that the effects of the manipulation may have been inflated due to demand 
characteristics. Stated differently, participants may have felt compelled to report greater 





confounding impact of demand characteristics, experimental research has suggested that effects 
of mood inductions using explicit instructions (i.e., not masking the true purpose) are not solely 
artifacts of demand characteristics and can indeed lead to changes in affect (e.g., Polivy & 
Doyle, 1980). Third, although our manipulation checks demonstrated specificity of the 
manipulation on subsequent psychological states measured by the VAS, it is important to note 
that other psychological states (e.g., sadness and happiness) not directly targeted were also 
affected by the manipulations (albeit to a lesser extent).  
To conclude, although we did not find an effect of induced worry, anger, or relaxation on 
interpretations of ambiguous situations or on attributions of intent to aversive situations, we 
found that GAD analogues reported greater threatening interpretations of ambiguous situations 
and attributed greater hostile intent to aversive situations than less anxious individuals. These 
findings suggest that individuals with GAD not only interpret ambiguous situations as 
threatening, but also interpret ambiguous intent as hostile. Treatments aiming to reduce 
threatening interpretations of ambiguous information have been developed and seem like 
promising techniques to reduce symptoms of anxiety (see Beard, 2011, for a review); our results 









The goals of this program of research were to further our understanding of the 
associations between anger and GAD by 1) examining the relative contributions of various forms 
of anger to symptoms of GAD, 2) examining the effects of induced state anger on cognitive 
vulnerabilities and processes associated with GAD, 3) examining the effects of induced worry 
and anger on cognitive processes associated with GAD and high trait anger, and 4) examining 
whether GAD analogues report greater hostile attributions of intent than do less anxious 
individuals.  
Summary of Findings  
Overall, we found that anger is positively associated with symptoms of GAD cognitive 
vulnerabilities and processes, including intolerance of uncertainty and threatening interpretations 
of ambiguous information. We also found that GAD is associated with hostile attributions of 
ambiguous intent. These cognitive processes may provide a potential pathway linking GAD and 
elevated anger. Results from study 1 demonstrated that compared to less anxious participants, 
GAD analogues reported high levels of numerous forms of anger. Specifically, elevated trait 
anger, anger suppression, and hostility differentiated GAD-analogue participants from less 
anxious participants. Within the GAD analogues, anger suppression and hostility uniquely 
predicted greater GAD symptom severity. These findings are consistent with the broader 
literature on anger and anxiety disorders (e.g., Bridewell & Chang 1997; Erdem et al., 2008; 
Erwin et al., 2003; Hawkins & Cougle, 2011; Meffert et al., 2008; Moscovitch et al., 2008; Orth 






Results from study 2 indicated that state anger predicted increases in intolerance of 
uncertainty, a cognitive vulnerability for GAD. Of the two higher order beliefs in the construct of 
intolerance of uncertainty (Sexton & Dugas, 2009), only the belief that uncertainty is unfair and 
spoils everything (and not the belief that uncertainty has negative self-referent and behavioural 
implications) was impacted by increases in state anger. In addition, state anger predicted 
increases in negative interpretations of ambiguous information, a cognitive process underlying 
GAD. These findings are in line with previous research demonstrating that intolerance of 
uncertainty mediates the relationship between anger and GAD symptoms (Fracalanza et al., 
2014), and that state anger increases the likelihood of reporting threatening interpretations of 
ambiguous information (Barazzone & Davey, 2009). Together, these findings provide 
preliminary support for the notion that cognitive factors partially explain the association between 
anger and symptoms of GAD.  
Results from study 3 failed to support the hypothesis that state worry and state anger, 
compared to relaxation, would increase threatening interpretations of ambiguous situations and 
would lead to greater hostile attributions of ambiguous intent. However, results showed that 
GAD analogues reported greater threatening interpretations and greater hostile attributions than 
less anxious participants. These associations were independent of induced affective state. Results 
from this study are consistent with previous research demonstrating  interpretation biases for 
threat in GAD (e.g., Eysenck et al., 1987; Mathews et al., 1989) and contribute to this literature 
with the novel finding that GAD symptoms are also associated with hostile attributions, a 
cognitive process associated with high trait anger (Owen, 2011). Therefore, it seems that GAD 
symptoms relate to information processing biases across anxiety- and anger-provoking 





A noteworthy difference emerged from the results of studies 2 and 3. Study 2 
demonstrated that induced state anger impacted the likelihood of interpreting ambiguous 
information as threatening, whereas study 3 found no effect of induced state anger on 
interpretation bias. Methodological differences in state anger inductions may account for this 
difference. The manipulation in study 2 involved anger about a present situation (i.e., a hostile 
experimenter), whereas the manipulation in study 3 consisted of an anger recall task. It is 
possible that the anger recall task elicited anger rumination to a greater extent than the emotion 
of anger and was therefore not powerful enough to impact cognitive processes. Although 
additional research is needed to address this inconsistency, the evidence from study 2 as well as 
from a previous study suggests that state anger does potentiate threatening interpretations of 
ambiguous information. Specifically, Barazzone and Davey (2009) paired anger-eliciting music 
with anger-inducing vignettes and found an increase in threatening interpretations of ambiguous 
homophone words compared to a control condition. This type of manipulation may have been 
similar in intensity to the manipulation used in study 2.   
Future Directions  
Findings from the current program of research suggest that GAD and anger comorbidity 
warrant further investigation. We examined the associations between anger and GAD with a 
series of correlational and experimental studies in non-clinical samples (i.e., no clinician-rated 
measures of GAD symptomology were included); an important future direction would be to 
examine these effects in clinician-diagnosed samples of individuals with GAD, as well as in 
samples of individuals seeking help for elevated anger. In addition, previous studies have 
demonstrated that elevated anger interferes with the successful psychological treatment of SAD 





treatment of GAD; future research should examine the effects of anger on outcomes of 
psychological treatments for GAD. Anger may interfere with the therapist-client alliance, 
homework compliance, or treatment credibility, all of which contribute to treatment progress 
(DiGiuseppe, Tafrate & Eckhardt, 1994). Similarly, elevated anger can lead to the experience of 
interpersonal problems (e.g., Scherer & Wallbott, 1994), and interpersonal problems, in turn, 
have been shown to predict poor response to cognitive-behavioural treatment for GAD 
(Borkovec, Newman, Pincus, & Lytle, 2002). Future research should aim to examine whether 
addressing anger during the treatment of GAD decreases interpersonal problems, thus promoting 
positive treatment outcomes. 
Further experimental research on the comorbidity between GAD and problematic anger 
would also be beneficial. For instance, it is currently unclear whether anger triggers worry and 
anxiety, whether worry and anxiety trigger anger, or some combination of both. Our results show 
that induced state anger directly increased negative beliefs about uncertainty and negative 
interpretations of ambiguous information; however whether these cognitive factors in turn 
produced greater worry is unclear. It is also unknown whether state worry or anxiety directly 
increases hostile cognitive processes, and whether this leads to greater state anger. Therefore, 
future studies should continue to investigate these associations with mediational study designs 
and experimental research. Experimental research in clinical psychology provides the ability to 
study clinical phenomena in highly controlled settings (Davey, 2003), and therefore notably 
contributes to our understanding of the nature of psychological distress.  
This program of research examined specific pathways linking anger and GAD, although a 
number of other possible associations may exist and warrant future investigation. One possible 





comorbidity. GAD is often comorbid with other psychological disorders, with comorbidity rates 
of up to approximately 90% (Blanco et al., 2014). Explanations have been provided for the 
comorbidity between GAD and depressive disorders, and include GAD and depression reflecting 
different expressions of a common underlying vulnerability (e.g., Clark, Waltson, & Mineka, 
1994) or the presence of a higher order construct such as negative affect (Clark & Watson, 
1991). Similar processes could also explain GAD and elevated anger comorbidity. For instance, 
a higher order negative affectivity factor (Clark & Watson, 1991) or shared biological 
vulnerabilities for hypervigilence and excessive responses to stressors (Barlow, 2002) may also 
function as risk factors for both excessive anxiety and anger. However, although the propensity 
to experience negative affect contributes to the experience of both emotional states, it is unlikely 
that negative affect explains all variability due to the distinct behavioural, motivational, and 
physiological profiles associated with anger and anxiety.  
Conceptual models of GAD provide another avenue for examining potential pathways 
linking GAD and anger. Indeed, one potential explanation for this association relates to the 
contrast avoidance model of GAD proposed by Newman and Llera (2011). The model suggests 
that individuals with GAD are averse to large shifts in emotional experiences, and they therefore 
tend to worry about worst possible outcomes to various situations to maintain a state of constant 
negativity. By sustaining a negative affective state, the distress associated with large changes in 
mood is reduced. Thus, having a lowered threshold for becoming angry may also serve to 
maintain negativity and avoid large shifts in emotionally contrasting states. Similarly, another 
conceptual model suggests that individuals with GAD tend to experience heightened emotional 
reactivity and poor emotional regulation (Macatee & Cougle, 2013; Mennin et al., 2005), and 





together, a number of mechanisms could explain the association between anger and GAD 
symptoms, in addition to the cognitive factors examined in the current series of studies.  
Implications  
Although many theories suggest that cognitive processes, such as interpretations and 
appraisals of events, elicit emotions (Clark & Beck, 2010; Lazarus, 1991), our findings are 
consistent with theories proposing that emotions also affect cognitive processes (Schwarz & 
Clore, 2007; Zajonc, 1984). Conceivably, intricate combinations of these theoretical perspectives 
likely explain the associations between anger and GAD symptoms. For instance, increased anger 
may potentiate perceptions of threat and danger in the environment, which in turn increases 
anxiety. Likewise, anxiety may potentiate perceptions of hostile intent in others, which in turn 
increases anger. Together, cognitive processes seem to be involved in the elicitation of worry and 
anxiety as well as anger, and the elicitation of these emotions may consequently feed back into 
biased cognitive processing. Therapeutically targeting the underlying cognitive processes may 
alleviate problematic anger as well as excessive worry and anxiety in individuals with GAD. The 
current series of studies also demonstrated that covert types of anger (i.e., anger suppression, 
hostility, hostile attributions) are associated with GAD symptom severity. Given the lack of overt 
behavioural manifestations of anger, these findings suggest that clinicians treating clients with 
GAD should not only assess overt anger, but also assess covert anger that may otherwise go 
unreported yet interfere with treatment success.  
To conclude, individuals with GAD seem to be prone to experience elevated anger, 
hostility, and anger suppression. Cognitive vulnerabilities, such as negative beliefs about 
uncertainty, and information-processing biases, such as increased perceptions of threat and 





GAD and high trait anger. Although further research is needed, assessing and addressing anger-
related difficulties in individuals with GAD could present an important avenue for refining 
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
This is to state that I agree to participate in a program of research being conducted by Sonya Deschenes, 
under the supervision of Dr. Michel Dugas in the Department of Psychology at Concordia University. 
Sonya Deschenes may be reached at 514-848-2424 ext. 2229 or by email at so_desch@live.concordia.ca. 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of the research is to investigate the relationship between anger, 
beliefs about perfection and uncertainty, and various symptoms of anxiety.  
B. PROCEDURES 
I have been informed that I will first be asked to read and sign this consent form.  Next, I will be asked to 
fill out a general information form and 9 questionnaires designed to assess different dimensions of anger, 
beliefs about perfection and uncertainty, and various symptoms of anxiety. These will be completed in a 
room with up to eight people. The completion of this study will take approximately 45 minutes. I will 
receive 1 participant pool credit as compensation for my participation.  Identifying information, which 
consists of my consent form and the lab copy of my participation receipt, will be stored separately from 
my data in the Anxiety Disorders Laboratory and each will be kept under lock and key.  Code numbers 
alone will be used to identify the questionnaires.  I understand that my participation in the study, and the 
information I provide, are strictly confidential.  I understand that I am free to discontinue my participation 
in the study at any time without negative consequences. 
If I am asked to return for a retesting session held approximately 4 weeks later, I will complete three of 
the questionnaires which I completed during the original testing session.  Participation in the retesting 
session will take approximately 15 minutes and I will receive another participant pool credit for attending 
the retesting session. 
 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
There is minimal risk associated with this study, however, it is possible that some of the questions I am 





difficulties).  The questionnaires in this study have been used in previous research and discomfort is rare.  
If, for some reason, I experience uneasiness or discomfort during testing, I should discuss it with the 
experimenter. 
I will benefit from my participation in this study in that I will receive credit for the Department of 
Psychology participant pool and will contribute to our understanding of the relationship between anger, 
beliefs about perfection and uncertainty, and anxiety. 
 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
• I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at anytime 
without negative consequences. 
• I understand that my participation in this study is ANONYMOUS (i.e., my participation will be 
tracked to provide course credit, but it will be impossible for my data to be linked to my identity). 
• I understand that the data from this study may be published.  
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT.  I 
FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
NAME (please print) _______________________________________________________________ 
SIGNATURE  _______________________________________________________________ 
 
If at any time you have questions about the proposed research, please contact the study’s Principal 
Investigator, Dr. Michel Dugas of the Department of Psychology at Concordia University at 514-848-
2424 ext. 2215 or by email at Michel.Dugas@concordia.ca.  
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research 


























Please read the following instructions carefully: 
Each scrambled sentence below contains 6 words. Your task is to rearrange the words in each 
scrambled sentence to form a meaningful statement. Use only 5 of the 6 words in each 
scrambled sentence to form each new statement. Indicate the proper order of the words in your 
new statement by placing a number over each of the five words indicating the proper order. 
 
For example, if you see the following 6 words: 
 
  1      2          3           4       5     6 
man  the  wearing  glasses  is  shoes 
 
You may choose to rearrange these words into the following meaningful 5-word statement: 
 
  2    1    5        3        6            
the man is wearing shoes    
 
 
Each sentence can be rearranged into more than one statement, but you should form only one 
statement from each scrambled sentence.  The new statements you form should be statements 
and not questions. Note that contractions (e.g., I'll, I'm, can't) are considered one word. You have 





1. disease always to rarely vulnerable I'm 
2. be likely I'll unlikely attacked it's 
3. are superiors my rarely usually impressed 
4. changes rarely disease suggest bodily usually 
5. succeed unlikely to academically I'm likely 
6. vulnerable I'm less others than more 
7. partner's improve worsen health will my 
8. will me my won't colleagues respect 
9. will my be harmed won't partner 





11. social make I can mistakes can't 
12. children me my will won't respect 
13. stability ruin cause decisions my financial 
14. my rated well is poorly work 
15. schoolwork my strengths weaknesses reveals challenging 
16. me my won't leave partner will 
17. catastrophic be arguments resolved family can 
18. will I enough have won't money 
19. be mild my symptoms will severe 
20. will date disappointed my be pleased 
 
Version B 
1. learning mistakes failure lead can to 
2. like won't people probably me will 
3. will friend sick won't get my 
4. danger rarely in often children are 
5. relationship won't romantic will last my 
6. serious my usually are injuries minor 
7. get illnesses better will most worse 
8. rarely possible stability is financial always 
9. can financial can't fixed mistakes be 
10. families stay won't will most together 
11. it's I'll promoted unlikely be likely 





13. my me family boring finds exciting 
14. strengthen marriage end a can disagreements 
15. rarely usually think teachers I'm intelligent 
16. strengths my notice others will faults 
17. risk am often I at rarely 
18. unlikely it's sick likely I'll get 
19. serious my will minor be illnesses 
























CONSENT FORM TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
This is to state that I agree to participate in a program of research being conducted by Sonya 
Deschenes, under the supervision of Dr. Michel Dugas of the Department of Psychology at 
Concordia University. 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of this research is to examine personality traits and how 
they relate to physiology during the performance of various tasks, including mental challenges 
and worry-related tasks. 
B. PROCEDURES 
After reading and signing this consent form, you will first be asked to complete a series of 
questionnaires. Following this, a heart rate monitor will be attached to you, and you will 
complete a series of tasks. These tasks include an anagram task, a task where you will 
unscramble words to make a sentence, a worry-related interview, as well as complete other 
questionnaires.  
C. RISKS, SECONDARY EFFECTS AND DISADVANTAGES 
It may be possible that certain measures or tasks temporarily cause slight uneasiness (possibly, 
by causing you to reflect on your difficulties). However, these measures and tasks have been 
used in previous research and discomfort is rare. If, for some reason, you should experience 
uneasiness or discomfort during testing, please discuss it with the experimenter. 
D. COMPENSATION 
You will receive a compensation of 2 Participant Pool points, as well as an entry in a draw for a 






All information collected from you throughout the course of this study will remain confidential, 
within the limits defined by law, and you will be identified solely by a numeric code. No 
publication or presentation resulting from this study will contain any identifying information.  
F. RIGHTS AS A PARTICIPANT 
If you accept to participate in this study, you are not giving up any of your rights or liberties to 
the researchers, funding organizations (Canadian Institutes of Health Research), nor are those 
involved released of their legal and professional responsibilities.  
G. VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL FROM THE STUDY 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. Therefore you are free to refuse to participate. You 
can also withdraw from the study at any moment without negative consequences (i.e., you will 
still be compensated for your time). 
H.  CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
 I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at 
any time without negative consequences. 
 I understand that my participation is this study is anonymous. 
 I understand that the data from this study may be published. 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. 
I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY 







If at any time you have questions about the proposed research, please contact the study’s Principal 
Investigator Dr. Michel Dugas, Department of Psychology, (514)848-2424 ext. 2215, 
Michel.dugas@concordia.ca. 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research 


























CONSENT FORM TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
Post-Study Consent 
This is to state that I have been made aware of the true nature of this study, and that I agree to 
have my data included in the final sample of the study (conducted by Sonya Deschenes and Dr. 
Michel Dugas of the Department of Psychology at Concordia University). 
 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the true purpose of this study is to examine the impact of trait and state anger 
on heart rate, beliefs about uncertainty, interpretations of ambiguous situations, and worry level.  
I have been informed that I was either in the anger induction condition or the neutral condition. The anger 
induction consisted of having the research assistant interact with me in a negative way prior to and during 
the anagram task, and her interaction with me was by no means related to my actual performance on the 
task. Finally, if I was in the anger induction condition, I have been told that the researchers aimed to 
increase my state anger in order to determine whether anger has a direct effect on heart rate, intolerance 
of uncertainty, interpretations of ambiguous situations, and levels of worry. It was important to conceal 
the true purpose of the study (by claiming that the goal of the study was related to personality and 
physiology during different tasks) to ensure the success of the manipulation.  
 
I have been informed that should I wish that my data not be retained for this study, I may indicate 
so by informing the experimenter. 
 
C. RISKS, SECONDARY EFFECTS AND DISADVANTAGES 
It may be possible that certain measures may have caused slight uneasiness temporarily (possibly, by 
causing you to reflect on your difficulties). However, these measures have been used previously many 
times and discomfort is rare. If you should, for some reason, experience uneasiness or discomfort 







You will receive a compensation of 2 Participant Pool points, as well as an entry in a draw for a $50 cash 
prize, for your participation in this study.  
 
E. CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information collected from you throughout the course of this study will remain confidential, within 
the limits defined by law, and you will be identified solely by a numeric code. No publication or 
presentation resulting from this study will contain any identifying information.  
 
F. RIGHTS AS A PARTICIPANT 
If you accept to participate in this study, you are not giving up any of your rights or liberties to the 
researchers, funding organizations (Canadian Institutes of Health Research), nor are those involved 
released of their legal and professional responsibilities.  
 
G. VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL FROM THE STUDY 
Your participating in this study is voluntary. Therefore you are free to refuse to participate. You can also 
withdraw from the study at any moment, without having to give an explanation when you make your 
decision known to the evaluator/experimenter.  
 
H.  CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
 I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at anytime 
without negative consequences. 
 
 I understand that my participation in this study is confidential. 
 
 I understand that the data from this study may be published. 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I 
FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 










If at any time you have questions about the proposed research, please contact the study’s Principal 
Investigator 
Dr. Michel Dugas, Department of Psychology, (514)848-2424 ext. 2215, Michel.dugas@concordia.ca. 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research 

































CONSENT FORM TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH  
“Thoughts and Interpersonal Behaviour” 
I understand that I have been asked to participate in a research project being conducted by Sonya 
Deschênes of the Psychology department of Concordia University (so_desch@live.concordia.ca; 
(514)848-2424 ext.2246),  under the supervision of Jean-Philippe Gouin of the Psychology department of 
Concordia University (jp.gouin@concordia.ca, (514) 848-2424 ext. 7538).  
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of this research is to examine the relations between 
thoughts, interpersonal behaviour, and cardiac activity. 
B. PROCEDURES 
I understand that I will be asked to participate in a 90-minute laboratory visit. I understand that 
during this visit, after reading and signing this consent form, I will be asked to complete a series 
of questionnaires about various personal characteristics such as my mood, my worries, and 
various thoughts about myself. Next, I will be asked to wear a heart rate monitor that will record 
my heart rate during different activities. I understand that I will first be asked to sit quietly for 
about 5 minutes. Following this, I will be asked to complete different tasks that will require me 
to either think about a recent or potential future event, or to relax, for approximately 5 minutes.  I 
understand that I will next complete computerized interpersonal behaviour tasks, and will finally 
be asked to rest for an additional 5 minutes.  
C. RISKS, SECONDARY EFFECTS AND DISADVANTAGES 
I understand that it may be possible that certain tasks temporarily cause slight uneasiness 
(possibly, by causing you to reflect on past or potential future difficulties). However, these 





I experience strong anxiety in response to the task, I should discuss this with the experimenter. I 
understand that I may also experience some mild skin irritation from wearing the heart monitor. I 
understand that I will receive participation credits for the Department of Psychology’s Participant Pool 
program after completing this research study. 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
• I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at anytime 
without negative consequences. 
• I understand that my participation in this study is CONFIDENTIAL (i.e., the researcher will know, 
but will not disclose my identity) 
• I understand that the data from this study may be published.  
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT.  I 
FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 
NAME (please print) __________________________________________________________ 
SIGNATURE  _______________________________________________________________ 
If at any time you have questions about the proposed research, please contact the study’s Principal 
Investigator, Sonya Deschênes, M.A., Department of Psychology of Concordia University, (514)848-
2424 ext. 2246, so_desch@live.concordia.ca, or contact Jean-Philippe Gouin, Ph.D., Department of 
Psychology of Concordia University, (514)848-2424 ext. 7538, jp.gouin@concordia.ca.  
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research 


























CONSENT FORM TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH  
“EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF WORRY ON HOSTILE COGNITIONS” 
Post-Study Consent 
This is to state that I have been made aware of the true nature of this study, and that I agree to 
have my data included in the final sample of the study (conducted by Sonya Deschenes of the 
Department of Psychology at Concordia University). 
 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the true purpose of this study is to examine the impact of worry and state anger 
on heart rate and hostile attribution bias, a cognition associated with anger.  
B. PROCEDURES 
I have been informed that I was either in the worry induction condition, the anger induction condition, or 
the relaxation (control) condition. It was important to conceal the true purpose of the study (by claiming 
that the goal of the study was related to thoughts and interpersonal behaviour) to ensure the success of the 
manipulation and dependent measures.  
 
I have been informed that should I wish that my data not be retained for this study, I may indicate 
so by informing the experimenter. 
 
C. RISKS, SECONDARY EFFECTS AND DISADVANTAGES 
I understand that it may be possible that certain tasks temporarily cause slight uneasiness 
(possibly, by causing you to reflect on past or potential future difficulties). However, these 
measures and tasks have been used in previous research and discomfort is rare. I understand that if 
I experience strong anxiety in response to the task, I should discuss this with the experimenter. I 





understand that I will receive participation credits for the Department of Psychology’s Participant Pool 
program after completing this research study. 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
• I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at any time 
without negative consequences. 
• I understand that my participation in this study is CONFIDENTIAL (i.e., the researcher will know, 
but will not disclose my identity) 
• I understand that the data from this study may be published.  
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT.  I 
FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 
NAME (please print) __________________________________________________________ 
SIGNATURE  _______________________________________________________________ 
 
If at any time you have questions about the proposed research, please contact the study’s Principal 
Investigator, Sonya Deschênes, M.A., Department of Psychology of Concordia University, (514)848-
2424 ext. 2246, so_desch@live.concordia.ca, or contact Jean-Philippe Gouin, Ph.D., Department of 
Psychology of Concordia University, (514)848-2424 ext. 7538, jp.gouin@concordia.ca.  
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research 
Ethics and Compliance Advisor, Concordia University, 514.848.2424 ex. 7481 
ethics@alcor.concordia.ca 
 
